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Preface
The purpose of this dissertation has been to address how firms in a differtiated and
imperfect market behave faced by a given, but limited, set of infonnation. In particular we
analyse this problem in a discrete choice context, Le. in a situation where the consumers are
allowed to choose only one brand and one item of each brand at a time.
The specific problem facing a finn in such a situation is how to assess the demand
from consumers. Since the producer has limited information the demand is uncertain.
Hence it has to be assessed, Le. the expected demand has to be calculated. In doing so,
every producer will have to decide on a probability distribution over the number of brands
available in the market for the industry in question.
Assuming rational behaviour at the hands of the producers, the probability distribution
will have to be set so that it accounts for all the available information, but nothing else.
Hence the probability distribution which will be used by a producer will be a distribution
which is unbiased with respect to the available information, and at the same time which is
in accordance with rational economic behaviour.
Assuming that the information set is equal for all firms involved, we first show that
there exists a unique probability distribution, which will be used byevery producer. This
distribution is a specific and explicit exponential distribution over the available information.
Consequently an expected demand relation can be constructed for every finn which
specifically indicates how a wide range of common information concerning prices,
marketing effort, information gained by a market survey, quality etc. will influence the
expected demand, to the extent that this information is seen to be relevant to the problem
under consideration. The specific parameters for each of these variables can be given a
precise interpretation based on how the assessment problem of the producers is constructed
in particular. Hence a theoretical foundation describing how the demand function should
be specified, in this particular context, is put forward.
Since a direct theoretical specification of expected demand is provided, such a demand
function can easily be submitted to empirical measurement. However, it should be pointed
out that this expected demand is demand as viewed by the producers, and as such only an
assessment of demand, not an expression of the demand that will materialize.
Secondly we prove that an expected equilibrium for such a differentiated market can
be established, assuming price to be the only strategic variable controlled by firms. This
expected equilibrium is a part of the total assessment done by firms in preparation for their
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offer in the market Based on this assessed equilibrium the firms present their offer in the
market, i.e. they offer a given quantity at a given price. If the firms have made a perfect
assessment, the equilibrium now reached will be equal to the expected equilibrium.
However, due to incomplete information, the actual equilibrium which occurs when the
offers are presented in the market will in principle differ form the actual equilibrium since
actual and expected demand usually will be different However, such historical
discrepancies constitutes themselves information which can be utilized by producers in the
next period, and subsequently such information can be comprised by the forwarded model
In conclusion a relatively comprehensive and axiomatic model is provided of how
producers behave faced with incomplete but specific information in a differentiated and
discrete market. However, it should be emphasized that the model presented does not
contain a meticulous analysis of interactions between producers. The aim is to model the
basic behaviour of producers when faced with uncertainty and incomplete information.
Hence the focus of this analysis is somewhat different from the bulk of the literature on
product differentiation, which is mainly directed towards the problem of equilibrium, and
producer interaction.
This dissertation was initiated out of my studies of the efficiency principle in the
context of discrete choice. The efficiency principle states that any population behaviour is
efficient if and only if the probability of observing a specific distribution, which represents
a lower overall cost, is greater than the probability of observing a more costly distribution
of the population. This principle places a specific constraint on any acceptable probability
distribution.
To present an axiomatic model of producer behaviour in a differentiated context being
my objective, I soon recognized that the problem facing the producer had structural features
in common with the solution to the problem of efficient population behaviour. But the
problems were not equal. However, the crucial point was that producers faced with limited
but specific information would have to make an assessment of how likely it was to observe
the choice of a particular brand. Furthermore, this assessment, which had to be a
probability distribution, should not be biased with respect to the information used in the
assessment. Hence the problem could in principle be solved by fitting a probability
distribution to the available information in the only unbiased way there is, Le. by
maximizing Shannon's (1948) measure of uncertainty. The idea which was derived from
the analysis done on the efficiency principle, was to insert the available market information
as constraints to this maximization problem. Thus an explicit and unique solution could be
deduced. This solution would have a specific interpretation, since the objective function, as
well as all the constraints, were clearly defined. Furthermore, this solution was the only
viii
possible unbiased solution to the clearly defined assessment problem which faced the
producers. Consequently the producers, if acting rationally, would use the derived
probability distribution as a measure of consumer reactions to the available information.
Hence, what is of particular interest in this dissertation is the acknowledgement that:
Producers will have to measure consumer reactions to a particular set of information, that
this measurement is uncertain, and that this measurement can in principle only be carried
out as described, if producers and consumers act rationally.
The work and comments of Professor Sven Erlander and of Lecturer Jan Lundgren of
the University of Linkoping have been valuable. The comments of and conversations with
Professor Agnar Sandmo at the Norwegian School of Economics have brought me
encouragement and insight I am greatly indebted to my father Nils Heegh-Krohn for his
comments and encouragement. I should also thank Professor Robert Grubbstrom at the
University of Linkoping for making bis time available to discuss my work; and finally I
will express my indebtedness to my friend and mentor, Professor Kurt Jornsten at the
Norwegian School of Economics for guidance, discussions, and inspiration.
The inspiration and support given by my spouse Vibeke, and my Mother Eva should
be mentioned when acknowledgement is to be granted.
I also wish to express my indebtedness to the Norwegian School of Management and
to the Norwegian School of Economics for fmancial support and general encouragement
Bergen, November 11, 1994
Nils E. Joachim Høegh-Krohn
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Chapter 1. Introduction.
1.1 The problem.
In this treatise I shall address and treat thoroughly the following problem in
connection with economic behaviour in differentiated markets: -,
Consider two different populations of economic agents. Let one population
named B consist of the producers of a particular product named 'If which is seen as
similar by the members of another population W. A member ofB is by definition
someone who produces a particular brand of 'If.A member of W is by definition
someone who agrees that every different brand of'lf is quite similar and who seeks
the consumption of a brand of 'If, and who buys only one brand and one item of that
brand at a time. The different brands of'lf are not in fact entirely similar, they are
differentiated. The members of W behave according to the general accepted axioms of
choice. The members of B seek to maximize their profit The only knowledge the
members of B have about the behaviour, i.e. the preferences and choices of the
members ofW, is that they behave in accordance with these axioms. This is common
knowledge. Nothing else is known, except the prices set by the members of B and a
set of incomplete market information, which are also common knowledge. The only
decision variable which the members of B control is the price of their own brand. The
problem which we eventually addiess is the characterization of the equilibrium in this
market
We will first clarify some terms. The term differentiated product is based on the
notion that some firms or producers and their products can be distinguished as a
group from all other firms and products in the economy, by the consumers. Such a
group of firms or producers is called an industry. The consumers view a particular
group of products within an industry to be strong if not perfect substitutes for one
another, and weak substitutes for any otherproduct in the economy. The term
differentiated products is thus defined on the basis of the subjective notions of the
consumers. No producer can by himself completely decide which industry he is in. A
producer may opt for a particular industry but end up in another, depending on the
subjective views of the population of consumers.
A particular sub-population of consumers W which demand the brands of a
particular industry B constitute the market for this industry's brands.
Such a market is discrete when the members of the sub-population W is only
interested in demanding one and only one alternative of all the alternative brands
offered in the industry, and only one item of such a brand at a time. Thus the term
discrete is also based on the subjective notions of the consumers. Only those
consumers that view a particular industry B as a differentiated and discrete collection
of alternatives will be members of W. All other consumers are excluded.
The problem stated above has not been extensively treated and solved as a
particular problem of interest, i.e. as a general, although restricted problem analysing
how producers view the consumers, and how this view affect the behaviour of
producers in a differentiated and discrete market
However, several topics related to this problem have been treated in the existing
literature - some quite extensively. The particular problem of strategic producer
behaviour in a differentiated market where the demand for each brand is assumed to
be known to the producers prior to their own decisions, have been treated most
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extensively. The classical works in this field are those of Hotelling (1929) and
Chamberlin (1933) analysing the interaction between producers assuming consumers
10 be a completely predictable entity. This tradition has been passed on by the bulk of
later literature, 10 the effect that most analyses of differentiated markets are based on a
population of consumers endowed with whatever characteristics are required to make
the analysis of producer or finn behaviour interesting. Usually this result in
presumptions about a representative consumer, where predictable consumer
behaviour is represented by a given demand relation. Thus these models are based on
the assumption that demand is known in advance 10 the producers, and that it is
continuous. These assumptions stated, the analysts proceed to discuss the most
intricate and detailed problems of finn or producer strategic behaviour, i.e. the
interaction between firms.
Consequently there are not many analyses dealing with the simpler yet
interesting, problem as far as strategic producer behaviour is concerned, of how
producers' view of consumer behaviour affect producer behaviour per se. It should
be evident that from the point of view of the producers, the demand from consumers
is not known, nor continuous, in most cases. In principle the future demand from the
consumers may be known by the consumers themselves, although this is not
obvious, but it is certainly not revealed 10 the producers before they have made their
offer to the market, by at least setting their initial prices, and determining initial
quantity available for transaction. It is not obvious whether this is recognized or not
by most analysts in this field of study, but the fact is that usually the demand from
consumers is assumed to be known by the producers, and 10 be continuous. Hence
the problem of how producers view the behaviour of consumers and, how this view
affect the behaviour of producers, should be regarded a fundamental problem which,
3
if solved - easily or not, should have implications for several more well known
problems in this field of study. This includes the problem of strategic producer
behaviour, which is afforded so much attention in the literature on market
differentiation.
The only work worth mentioning dealing with the problem of producer
assessment of demand, is Anderson, de Palma & Thisse (1992), who also sum up all
the earlier attempts of incorporating this problem into the analysis of differentiated
markets. Anderson et al (1992) do not attempt to solve the problem of how rational
consumer behaviour affect producers. Their emphasis are on strategic firm behaviour
in discrete and differentiated markets. However, the discreteness of demand adds a
new dimension to the problem of strategic behaviour in differentiated markets,
compared to the more usual approach of known continuous demand relationships for
every firm. When discrete choice is introduced the consumer side of the strategic
problem is given increased weight. Consequently Anderson et al (1992) have to add
assumptions about how firms view such situations, to solve their particular problem.
The pertinent question is of course what assumptions do Anderson et al (1992)
introduce to cope with this added problem of the strategic analysis. The solution is the
same as has been applied to pure demand analyses of discrete demand, e.g. Borsch-
Supan (1985), McFadden (1974, 1975, 1976), Rust (1985), and Train (1986), to
mention a few. Accordingly they solve the problem by introducing additional
assumptions about consumer behaviour - not by introducing assumptions about
producer behaviour, which would be the reasonable course to take. They quite simply
assume that consumers have random preferences, and that the distribution of these
preferences is known to all agents involved. Both these assumptions are of course
unreasonable. We will show that they are also unnecessary. Despite the obvious
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misconception embedded in the assumption of random preferences this approach is in
fact quite common when attempting to solve such problems. In an econometric
context of discrete choice this approach may have some precedence, to the extent that
the behaviour can be viewed as random from the outside. It is, nevertheless, based on
a misconception. The greater misconception, however, is the assumption that the
distribution of these random preferences is known to every economic agent, including
the producers. Anderson et al (1992) do not state explicitly that the producers possess
this information, but this assumption follows indirectly from their representation of
demand in their altogether too complex model.
Based on these assumptions of convenience Anderson et al (1992) derive a so
called logit model, based on a certain assumed distribution of the preferences, to
represent demand from the consumers. This problem having been solved they then
turn to strategic considerations at the hand of the producers.
The problem of using such a model as is advocated by Anderson et al (1992),
can be attributed to the underlying reason for the assumption of random preferences:
The preferences are of course not random, but the modellers, that is Anderson et al,
do not know the preferences of the consumer, and therefore have to perceive these as
random. Thus they are not facing up to the problem of unknown consumer
preferences irretrievable connected with the inclusion of actual economic agents
included in the model, but instead deal with it as a problem of the modellers. Since the
randomness of the consumer's preferences is not believed 10 be an actual problem of
reallife for any relevant economic agents, the distribution of this artificial randomness
also have to be decided upon by the modellers themselves and specified as an
additional assumption in their model. The assumption of a particular preference
distribution is consequently the fundamental weakness of the random utility models
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in dealing with analysis of differentiated markets.
We will approach the problem of how producers should view the behaviour of
consumers, and how this view affects producer behaviour, directly. First we
recognize that demand from consumers is not observable before the producers have
presented their offers in the market When the offers are presented then the consumers
respond with action. Consumers may of course express their wishes and desires in
advance of the offers from the producers, but there is no way that the producers can
trust these expressions to be matched by realizations when the offers are presented
later on. Thus the producers will in any case have to make a subjective assessment of
the demand they will face for different price levels. This assessment on the hands of
the producers will have to take into consideration not only the behaviour of the
consumers, but also the interaction with all the other producers in the industry. Hence
the offer a single member of industry B will present to the market is the price, and
demand he expects to receive in equilibrium. However, only when the producer has
presented his price and the corresponding quantity that he expects to be consumed at
this price will he be able to observe the real demand, which may very well differ
considerably from his expectations.
This being so it should be evident that the producers will have to assess demand
Thus the problem arises at the hand of the producers, and it is the behaviour of this
group that has to be elaborated further, not the behaviour of the consumers. That this
is so is due to the fact that the demand from consumers is deterministic when the
price is known to the consumers, but from the point of view of the producers the
demand is unknown prior to their own decisions and hence has to be measured.
Accordingly we will only assume normal rational consumer behaviour, within
the context of discrete and differentiated markets. No other assumption is made
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concerning consumers. In particular we do not assume that consumers have random
preferences, and that the distribution of these preferences is known to the producers
or to anybody else. To the general accepted assumptions about consumer behaviour
we add some easily accepted assumptions of firm behaviour, which in summary say
that firms seek to maximize their profits, that demand is measured by probabilities,
and that these probabilities are based only on the information available to the
producers. On the basis of these assumptions we arrive at the following solution to
our problem:
Confronting a discrete and differentiated market the members of B will have to
assess the demand from the members of W. Due to the lack of information as to the
preferences of the members ofWover the available alternatives, this assessmentis
made using the concept of probability. Assuming that all producers know how all
other producers set their prices, we next show that all producers will use a particular
class of probability distributions which are unbiased, and incorporate all the
information available. For certain assumptions this class of distributions are similar to
the distribution that is derived using the logit approach. However, the interpretation of
the results are quite different since the fundamental assumptions are different When
the logit is based on random utility, and a known distribution ofpreferences, our
model is based on a subjective derivation by economic agents of an assessment of
how other economic agents will behave. Thus our model have a meaningful
economic interpretation, where the logit solution at the best has an unclear
interpretation as to the fundamental notions concerned.
Our class of distributions is then used by the members of B to calculate the
expected demand, and profit, and eventually to derive the expected market
equilibrium, which in tum is used to determine the producers' offer to the market
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Since the assessment used by the producers is uncertain by nature, and since the
producers use this assessment to set their price and quantity, the actual observed
equilibrium may differ from the expected equilibrium. This is due to the fact that the
real demand from consumers is unknown, and at given prices this demand may tum
out to be different from the demand expected, and the quantity offered, by each
producer.
In consequence of what has been stated above, the idea behind this treatise can
be outlined as follows: Whereas Anderson et al (1992) choose to introduce a random
element into their analysis in order to solve a technical problem, our aim is to model
human economic behaviour. In doing so we place our emphasis on the challenges
facing the different agents, depending upon the different roles of these agents. In
particular we recognize the role played by the members of the population of producers
in a particular market Adhering to the same underlying principles of economic
behaviour as do the consumers, the producers confront a certain lack of information
concerning the preferences of the consumers. This predicament has to be considered a
fact of life. A central theme of our treatise is to answer the question of how an
economic agent, playing the role of a producer, solves the problem of assessing
demand from the consumers in face of his lack of information, Instead of solving this
real problem by introducing a particular distribution of preferences, presumably
adhered to by all the members of the population of producers, we place the emphasis
on deducing how the producers will behave in such a situation given the limited
information they possess, and the implications of this behaviour for equilibrium in the
market.
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Let us spell out our view in greater detail. A market is identified by a group of
agents demanding a sort of product, i.e. consumers, and a group of suppliers
supplying the product, Le. producers. We are studying differentiated markets where
the product under consideration is a group of brands that are perceived as similar, but
non-identical, and where each producer produces his particular brand of the product
Characterizing the equilibrium in this market being our objective we have to describe
both consumer and producer behaviour. Since both consumers and producers are
human economic agents, both are assumed to behave according to the basic principles
of human economic behaviour, Le. the general accepted axioms of choice. But as a
consequence of the different roles that the agents playas consumers and producers the
situation differs between them, and consequently they preform different actions in
order to gain their objectives.
In concerning ourselves with differentiated markets we assume that each
consumer chooses only one alternative or brand at a time, and that he or she then only
chooses one item of each alternative. The income which is not spent on the alternative
chosen by the consumer is used to consume the general product, which represents all
other products in the economy except the alternatives included in the set of
differentiated products under consideration. Saving is also included in the general
product. Hence, in a later period, which in theory may be a few seconds later, the
consumer can make use of his savings to demand another item of the same alternative
or an item of another alternative. Thus the assumption that the consumers only buy
one item of one alternative at a time is no real constraint on our model's generality.
But, it is a necessary assumption in order to derive our model.
Characterizing the behaviour of the producers, our next assumption is that the
producers assume that the consumers behave according to the axioms of choice. That
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is - the producers know how consumers behave. But they do not know the
preferences of the consumers, and consequently which brand each consumer will
eventually choose. Consequently each producer will have to make an assessment of
the demand he is facing given the price of his brand, price being the only strategic
variable he controls.
The question therefore is how this assessment is to be done. We assume that the
producers measure the choices of the consumers using probabilities. Thus a producer
measures the probability that his particular brand will be chosen, given the set of
prices of all brands in question - which is assumed to be generally known. In this
way a distribution of choice probabilities is formed, which consists of a probability of
choice for every brand in the differentiated product set under consideration. This
probability distribution, being formed by each producer to measure the choices of the
consumers, will be shaped so that it is unbiased, and so that it satisfies the axioms of
choice, known to every producer to guide the consumers in making their choices, and
the assumption that each consumer chooses only one alternative and one item of this
alternative at a time - since this is all the information that a producer possesses.
A simple but important theorem, characterizing the probability distribution in
question, can now be deduced from the assumptions stated above: Assuming that the
price of one alternative i is not greater than that of an other alternative j, the probability
distribution p* will be such that the probability of a consumer choosing alternative i is
not less than the probability that the same consumer will choose j. It should be noted
that this is a result deduced from the assumptions laid down, which the probability
distribution of choice for a single consumer has to satisfy to be in accordance with the
assumptions set forth and in which the producers believe. But, at this stage we also
know that in principle this result p* in not necessarily the only distribution which
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satisfies the behavioural assumptions we have stated above.
Next we recognize that a corresponding distribution is achieved when analysing
the distribution of particles in a thermodynamic system, assuming that the particles
behave in accordance with the first and second laws of thermodynamics. This
distribution problem of thermodynamics, as a problem of logics, 'is in principle
similar to the assessment problem confronting the producers, which is, and this
should be underlined, the problem of deciding upon their own subjective probability
distributions of consumer demand, Le. how the consumers are to be distributed
among the alternatives in question. Subsequently we observe that our result p*
represents the only unbiased distribution with respect in both the case of producer
assessment in a differentiated market, and in the thermodynamic case - given the state
of information. Thus the resulting p* is the only probability distribution an economic
agent in the role of a producer will use in calculating the expected demand from a
population of consumers. This conclusion follows from the assumption of rational
producer behaviour, which implies that every producer will use the probability
distribution that takes into account all the relevant information, and nothing more.
At this stage we have arrived upon a probabilistic model. But it is not a
probabilistic model of behaviour. It is a model that duly respects the fact that the
choices of the consumers are deterministic. The probabilistic component consists in
the fact that we recognize the necessity of the producer to measure the demand from
the consumer, and that he is left with no other choice but to measure this through the
use of probabilities. Thus the model has probabilistic elements which are assumed to
be present in the problems of the real world, and which are not merely technical
assumptions of convenience. Hence the use of probabilities is an element
characterizing the behaviour of the producers, and not that of the consumers.
1 1
Furthermore, we do not assume a particular underlying probability distribution of
consumer preferences. On the contrary we shall show that there is a unique form of
the probability distribution that satisfies the results spelled out above, and thus
satisfies the above stated assumptions about consumer behaviour.
The choice probability distribution p* is of a particular exponential fonn and is
used by the producers to calculate their expected demand and thus their expected
income and costs, and therefore, to decide upon which price they will offer to the
market, considering the prices of their competitors. We then turn to the question of
the existence of market equilibrium, upon which we conclude that the existence of a
price equilibrium can be assured for our particular model.
Finally, in chapter 8, we extend our information set to also included inprinciple,
a wide range of firm specific and industry related information such as marketing
effort, quality, and market surveys. The equilibrium solution which is obtained for
the basic model, will also apply to the enlarged model. Consequently a model which
account for a wide range of information in addition to uncertainty is provided.
One last question remains. Some analyst may argue that in the aggregate, and at
the limit, the expected demand function in our model may be perceived as a
detenninistic demand relation. This is wrong and the argument is built on a
misconception.It is a fact that the demand from consumers is unknown to the
producers. Hence they will have to make an assessment of this demand which is not
yet to be observed. Since this demand is uncertain to the producers this uncertainty
has to be incorporated into the model - and it is not obvious that a model incorporating
uncertainty will have the same properties that a model avoiding to cope with this
uncertainty .
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However, in principle the producers of differentiated products calculate the
expected demand using one or another probability distribution of consumer choice.
Therefore, when some analysts use deterministic demand relations and do not
mention choice probabilities at all, the same analysts are implicitly assuming an
aggregate demand situation, where the concepts set forth in this treatise are the
unrevealed underlying concepts. Our claim is thus that the way of analysing the
particular problem that concerns us in this treatise is revealed through the idea of
producer assessment, as it is set forth below.
In summary, we specify a model of price equilibrium in differentiated markets,
based only on reasonable descriptions of consumer and producer behaviour, without
assuming anything like random utility behaviour, or that demand can be represented
by a logit model. The focus of this analysis is on the modelling of producer
behaviour. It is this view of how producers measure demand from consumers in a
differentiated market that brings about our results, i.e. a consistent model of price
equilibrium in differentiated markets. Hence, our basic axiom or hypothesis is that
producers actually calculate expected demand assuming that consumers behave
according to the axioms of consumer choice. If this hypothesis is true, then it follows
that the distribution of choice probabilities can be represented by a particular
exponential form over prices.
1.2 Structure.
The structure of this treatise is laid out so that in chapter 2 the fundamental
concepts of consumer behaviour in a discrete and differentiated context are presented.
The concepts introduced in this chapter represent the basic notions on which we
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elaborate in the succeeding chapters. Inchapter 3 we state our problem, and the
notion of probability is introduced. Inchapter 4 previous models such as logit are
presented and discussed. In chapter 5 we proceed to discuss the general problem of
assessment of probabilities from uncertain information. Here we consider problems
both in physics and in information theory. Inchapter 6 we set forth how producers
will behave faced with the fact that the actions of the consumers are unknown; and
finally in chapter 7 we derive the expected and the real market equilibrium for our
problem. Eventually in chapter 8, we present an extension of the basic model, in
addition to some comments on econometrics. In this chapter we also sum up our
results.
1.3 On notation.
Since this is a work of economics, mathematical, logical and other technical
terms and expressions which are not assumed universally known by the average
economist, will be explained in the text or in footnotes.
I shall now introduce my terminology and state the meaning of these terms. In
this treatise we are going to raise questions and give answers within a limited field of
study. One of the simplest yet most effective ways of answering a logical question is
through the use of a definition. A definition is an agreement, by all parties
concerned, as to the meaning of a particular term. Thus, the defmitions set forth in
this treatise is expected to be generally accepted, although some might be of a more
controversial character. When an answer to a question of interest can not be given as a
definition we have to give it as a statement. A proposition is a true statement of
interest that we are trying to prove. Some more important statements of interest are
referred to as theorems. A proof is a convincing argument of the truthfulness of a
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proposition or a theorem. In executing a proof we may use supporting statements that
are each proved separately, to support the proof of the main statement These
supporting statements are referred to as lemmas. Inproving a statement we usually
have to build on statements that are assumed to be true, but that can not be proved to
be true. These unproved statements are referred to as axioms. --
Some notation. The sign 1\ is logical and; v is logical or, a set is a collection of
elements and denoted x = (••••); x is the Cartesian product of two or more sets; xcy
means that the set x is contained in the set y; xe y means that the set x is an element of
the set y;-. stands for the logical nor, V is the logical quantifier for every.
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Chapter 2. Fundamental concepts of economic behaviour.
We concern ourselves in this chapter with the fundamental concepts of consumer
and producer behaviour in a differentiated discrete market. Based on these
fundamental concepts of behaviour, we will analyse in the following chapters the
interaction between these groups of agents in this particular market. Thus this chapter
sets forth the fundamental concepts describing the economic behaviour of both
consumers and producers. The economic behaviour of both consumers and producers
is assumed to be common knowledge to both groups, and anything which can be
deduced by logic from the concepts introduced in this chapter is of course also
common knowledge. The consequences of these concepts, i.e. the specific choices of
the consumers, are however not assumed to be known, since the concepts only say
how preferences are formed and not which preferences the consumers have. But, as
we will show, the choices of the producers can be deduced from these concepts.
This theory concerns those markets which can be described as differentiated and
discrete. The term differentiated means that the products among which the consumers
may choose are similar but not equal in quality. By discrete we mean that the
consumers can choose only one item of one alternative at the time.
2.1 The primitive concepts.
We start by assuming the existence of two different groups of individuals called
the population of consumers and the population of producers, denoted W and B,
respectively. A specific individual can of course be a member of both groups. The
groups are separated by their purposes. The population of consumers have as their
common purpose to consume, whereas the purpose of the population of producers is
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toproduce.
There exists many different populations of consumers and of producers and a
particular individual can be a member of several such populations. But, there exists
no population of consumers, however, without a corresponding population of
producers. Thus every population of consumers is distinguished from other
populations of consumers by its relationship with a particular and unique population
of producers, and vice versa. Two such connected populations of consumers and
producers seen as a whole is called a market Thus the population of consumers in a
differentiated and discrete market, and the corresponding population of producers,
together fonn the market of differentiated and discrete products.
A market is described through a description of the behaviour of the individuals
of the populations, Le. the behaviour of the populations, and the interaction between
the different populations. Such a description is called a theory of the particular market
in question. In the following we will set forth a specific theory of differentiated and
discrete markets.
Two particular populations defining a market are distinguished from all other
populations by the concepts which connect them, directly or indirectly. Thus a theory
of a particular market is characterized by a certain set of concepts. But, as nothing
comes from nothing, therefore some of the concepts characterizing our theory have to
be primitive 1, in terms of which all other concepts are defined. Thus, we start out to
set forth a set of primitive concepts which represent our chosen starting point To start
with, these concepts may be perceived as purely formal, but they are chosen on the
basis of an impression or a general idea of what confronts the consumers and the
1 A primitive concept is an initial and general idea or notion of a theory that can not be
defined by or deduced from any other notions. It is a basic element of a theory without
which the theory is meaningless.
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producers when they are to make their choices. For all practical purposes the reader
may choose to consider these concepts as chosen by the author as a "reasonable" set
of basic concepts.
To complete the theory we shall present axioms which are statements about
properties of the primitive concepts. From these axioms other properties which we
shall name propositions or theorems are deduced. Thus the primitive concepts, the
axioms, the propositions, and theorems together represents our theory. That is, a
theory about the properties of the primitive concepts. If the primitive concepts are
interpreted as economic concepts, as they are in our case, we have an economic
theory. Thus by interpreting the primitive concepts as concepts describing the
populations of consumers and producers forming together a non-specific
differentiated and discrete market, we have a general theory of differentiated and
discrete markets.
The primitive concepts are:
PC!: A population W.
PC2: A population B.
PC3: An abstract set X.
PC4: An abstract set C.
We will in the following first give a preliminary interpretation of these concepts,
and then in later sections elaborate the properties of the concepts further.
Since we are to set forth an economic theory we will interpret the primitive
concepts in economic terms.
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PCl, the population W, is the population of consumers making choices from the
choice space X. In the following we will describe how the members of W are
behaving in making such choices.
PC2, the population B, is the population of producers, providing some of the
elements of X, and choosing a price fonn the set C.
PC3, the abstract set2 X, is called the choice spaces, which is the set of all
elements that might possibly be elements of a choice set, denoted M. A choice set M
is the set of elements from which a member of W has to choose one and only one
element ,or point Thus, a choice set M is a subset of X. On X we will also assume
the existence of a binary relation R on X, which is a preference relation, which orders
the elements of X in more preferred and less preferred,
PC4, the abstract set C is called the price-income space, which we interpret as
the space of all prices that may be chosen by the producers of population B for the
commodities that in combination can constitute the elements of X, and the incomes
that may occur for the consumers in a given population W.
2 Abstract set. On the term set A set or a class is a group of things or objects, i.e. a
collection of distinct numbers, objects, etc. that is treated as an entity in its own right,
and with identity dependent only upon its own members. In other words, a collection of
anything is a set. On the term of abstraction: Abstraction is the process by which
allegedly we form concepts on the basis of experience or of other concepts, Le. an
abstract set is a set formed on a basis of a particular concept. If we have experienced the
concept of human choice, then a choice set is an abstract set formed on the concept of
choice. Thus the difference between a general set and an abstract set is that a general set
may be a collection of anything, e.g. the set (5, the sun) is a general set, when an
abstract set is a collection of something that is selected through the use of a particular
concept.
3 Choice space. On the term space: A space is a set of elements or members, called
points, which are structured by using a set ofaxioms which the points have to satisfy.
The elements of a choice space are those elements that are elements of a choice set. Thus
the choice space contains as elements all the alternatives that can be chosen.
19
2.2 The choice mace.
We have interpreted X as the choice space of the population W. As a space
containing points or elements which are bundles of commodities, it has to have
specific properties concerning the relationship between the points in question. A
reasonable assumption is that the points of choice space X are related by a distance
function or a metric describing the exact relationship between any two points of X.
We therefore assume X to be contained in the metric spaces of the Euclidian I-spaceS.
Thus, we state:
Sl Axiom.
Xc9t~, where 9t, 9t+, and 9t++ denote the Real numbers, the nonnegative
reals, and positive Reals, respectively.
The assumption ofaxiom SI that the choice space is contained in the Euclidian
space of reals is not especially reasonable since we usually observe that consumers
buyeither 1, 2 or more items of a product, not, say, 0.456 of a car. But the
assumption is stated as a matter of analytical convenience.
4 A space where for any two points x and y there is associated a real number d(x,y)
called the distance, such that (i) d/x,y) > O, if x*y; (ii) d(x,y) = d(y,x); (iii) d(x,y) S
d(x,z) + d(z,y), for any ZE X. A function with these properties is called a distance
function or a metric.
5 Euclidian space or Cartesian space: The basic axiom the points of an Euclidian space have
to satisfy is that the points are vectors. On the term vector. An element that can be
located by a single n-tuple of coordinates. Thus the Euclidian space can be said to be an
abstraction of the three-dimensional space of daily experience, Le. the n-fold cartesian
product of real fields, Le. a space of n-vectors. In our particular problem every element
is a point in the Euclidian I-space.
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S2 Definition.
A choice set McX, containing as elements all possible choices for a individual
memberofW.
From definition S2 follows that all possible choice sets for every member of W
are subsets of X. Now we denote the set containing all the subsets of X that can
possibly be choice sets for all individuals ofW concerned, as T. i.e. MeT, T~.
Each choice set M consists of a number of elements or points. One set may
contain only a few elements, when an other contains several.
S3 Axiom.
Every choice set Me T consists of consumer points x=[\jf, xr]e 9tI, where
\jI=[xI,,,.,xI_de'l', where 'I'={[xI=1,x2=0, ... ,xI_I=0],
[XI=0,X2=1 ,x3=0, ... ,xI_I=0],···, [xl =0 •... 'Xi_l=0'Xi=1.Xi+l=0' ... 'XI_1=O]'
... , [XI=0' ... 'XI_2=0,XI_I=1]}c9tI-\ xIe XIc9t.6
In axiom S3 the consumer points of the choice sets can be interpreted as
consisting of two commodities, a differentiated commodity denoted by 'IIwhich is
differentiated into l-l different alternatives of which the set 'I' is the complete
collection of the l-l possible choices; and a general good xI consisting of a blend of a
all other commodities in the economy that a consumer may possible choose, of which
the set XI is the complete collection of all possible blends of this general commodity.
Our problem is to model the market of differentiated and discrete products. The
6 A set is denoted by (... ) or {... }. A point, an element or a vector is denoted [···1. A set is
a collection of points, elements, vectors. A point or a vector is an ordered n-tuple of
coordinates.
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set '¥ contains all the possible elements that can be chosen by any consumer of the
consumer population concerning the differentiated product. Since only one item of
this product can be chosen by each consumer the set '¥ consists only of the unit and
zero values of each of the l-l alternatives of this product. It should be noted that there
is no such restriction is placed on the general good which can be consumed in several
combinations, and in various quantities.
XI is the set of all possible quantities of the general good xI' It is now clear that
the choice space consists of the Cartesian product? of'¥ and XI:
The elements or the consumer points of the choice space X are every
combination of the elements of'¥ and the elements of XI' If the set XI contains Y
different elements, i.e. quantities, then since the set'¥ contains l-l elements the total
number of consumer points or elements in X is Y·(I-l).
In modelling a differentiated and discrete market, the focus is on how consumers
choose from the set '¥ and how the producers who produce the alternatives of this
set, determine their prices. We will return to how producers behave in later sections,
in the following sections our focus will be on how consumers choose, Le. on how
the choice sets M are formed and how consumers choose a single element x=['I',xJ]
from these sets.
7 Cartesian product or cross product: The set of ordered n-tuples the elements of which
are respectively members of ~ sequence of the given sets. In our case of 'PxX1• this
means that any combination of the the members of these sets will be an element of the
Cartesian products of these sets.
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In the following sections we will describe the economic behaviour of the
members of the consumer population W.
2.3 On consumers' ability to choose.
By consumer behaviour we mean how a member ofW makes his choice from
the choice space X. We are thus to describe how members of the consumer
population W choose an element, that is a consumer point or vector x=[""xd,
'ile '¥,xIe XI' from their choice sets McX.
Observe two such elements x,ye X. It is reasonable to assume that a member of
W have a preference for one of the elements or is indifferent between them. That is,
the member of W has a perception of which of the elements he would like to receive if
he had to choose among them, or he would be indifferent if he received one instead of
the other. Thus it is reasonable to assume that every member of W is able to compare
every two elements x,ye X and prefer one to the other or be indifferent between them.
Such behaviour represents in fact a binary relation between every couple of elements
in X:
S4 Definition.
If for every couple of elements {x,y}e X, a certain statement about these
elements, in the given order, can only be true or false, this statement
establishes a binary relation on X. If this relation is denoted by R, we have
xRy ifthe statement is true and x-sRy iffalse.
There are many binary relations, but we are only interested in ordering relations
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which we define to have one of the following properties:
SS Definition.
If x,y,ze X and R is a ordering relation on X, then R is said to be
a. transitive if xRy A yRz :::::)xRz,
b. complete if 'T;fx,yeX: xRy v yRx,
c. a-symmetric if xRy :::::)y--Rx.
That the ordering relation R is transitive: Ifx is ordered before y, and y before z
thenx should be ordered before z.
That R is complete means that there exists an ordering: For two elements x and
y, either x is ordered before y or y before x. A situation where the elements of X is
not ordered can not exist
That R is a-symmetric means that a specific order implies that the reverse order
can not be true.
Three different ordering relations of interest have at least one of these properties:
S6 Definition.
The ordering relation R means "at least as good as".
R(B) means "better than", and
R(E) means "equivalent to".
The relation R is transitive. The strict relation R(B) is transitive and a-symmetric.
The relation R(E) is transitive. Neither of the relations are obviously complete. We
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assume that it is a property of the population of consumers W that the consumers have
to choose an element from their choice set. They can not choose to choose nothing.
Thus we assume that:
S7 Axiom.
All consumers of the consumer population W have an ordering relation on X
that is a complete preordering, Le. that it is transitive and complete. This
requires
xRy " yRz ~ xRz,
'Vx,ye X: xRy v yRx.
From this assumption the following property can be deduced:
S8 Proposition.
'Vx,ye X: xR(B)y v xR(E)y v yR(B)x.
Proof: Weddepohl (1970). It follows from the definition ofR and R(E) that
xR(E)y <=> xRy" yRx, and from the definition ofR(B) that xR(B)y <=> xRy "
y-,Rx. Since it follows from axiom S7 that the ordering relation is complete
and transitive the relations R(E) and R(B) have to exist, and proposition S8 is
true. QED.
Proposition S8 says that if a consurnerranks the alternatives open to him in a
transitive and complete way, then there exists an ordering relation that is such that
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either x is preferred to y, or y is preferred to z, or the consumer is indifferent between
x andy. This is reasonable behaviour.
Proposition S8 implies that every member ofW has a most preferred element or
a group of most preferred elements among the elements open to him for choice from
X. If the choice set McX denotes the set of elements of X that is-open for choice to a
member ofW, then among the elements of M there has to be an element that is most
preferred or a group of elements that is most preferred, since a binary relation which
is defmed on X is also defined on any subset of X. Thus ifX is a choice space, and
M is a choice set, certain points of M can eventually be considered as "best elements"
to the consumer since it follows from proposition S8 that the consumer will prefer
some points over other points in the choice set.
S9 Definition.
IfR is a binary relation on a set X and if R is transitive and McX, then xOeM
is said to be a greatest element of M, if 'Vye M: x~y.
Then we may only have that x~(E)y or xOR(B)y. It is excluded that y and xO
are not comparable, and that yR(B)xo.
Hence a choice set M, always contains a greatest element, or a preferred choice,
i.e. a "best element". That is, a consumer will always be able to say that there is a
most preferred element or a group of elements that are most preferred to all the other
elements, even though the consumer is indifferent between the elements within this
group.
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So far we have concluded that with every member of W is associated a choice
set. With every choice set is associated its maximal elements, i.e, the elements
preferred by the member to all other elements included in M. Thus we may define:
SlO Defmition.
A set l' is called a power set of a set X, if
Mel' <=> MeT.
Thus, the power set is the set of all subsets of X. IfX is preordered, with every
element of T, that is, with every subset of X, can be associated its maximal elements.
We define a correspondence H: l' ~X.
SIl Definition.
IfX is a set, preordered by a relation R, and l' is its power set, we have for
every Me 1': H(f) = {xe M Iye M ~ xRy v y=Rx].
IfR is a complete preordering, then by proposition S8, H(M) is the set of
greatest elements of Me 1'. That is the set of elements or the element that is preferred
over all other elements of the choice set M of the consumer.
2.4 On how consumers make choices.
We have to this point assumed that R is transitive and complete. These
assumptions say something about the members ofW's ability to make a choice, in its
own right, from a choice set. They do not say everything about how these choices are
made. We are therefore to proceed by completely describing how the members of the
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population W make choices, but not which choices they make.
Assume a member of W is confronted by the problem of choosing between two
elements x,ye X consisting of the same commodities, but in different quantities, i.e. x
~ y. ff this commodity is desired in its own right by the consumer, then it is
reasonable to assume that the consumer will prefer more to less of it:
SI2 Axiom.
x ~ y=> xRy,
x> y => xR(B)y.
Axiom S12 is called the monotonicity axiom since it assumes the existence of a
ordering relation R on X, such that it orders a point x as better than an other point y if
this first point x represents more of something that is wanted than the other point
does. Together with axiom S7 which specifies that all consumers have a binary
relation that is a complete preordering, this axiom defines what has been termed
rational behaviour. Thus, we are assuming that the consumers are rational, which is
reasonable.
SI3 Axiom.
o 10'Vx eX: {x xRx } is convex",
To assume that the ordering relation R on X is such that it ranks the elements of
the choice space into a convex set of more or gradually less preferred choices, implies
8 Convex set: A set Ac9{1 is called convex, if XEA 1\ YEA 1\ I..E [0,1] => t..x+(1-I..)YE A.
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that all points on a line segment connecting two points that are preferred to a third, are
also preferred to this point, or equivalently, all points on a line segment are preferred
to the worst of the two points it connects, which is reasonable.
2.5 A universal orderin~.
We shall now introduce the concept of a utility function. Conceptually a utility
function may be viewed as an expression of the mechanism that orders the elements
xe X. It is obvious from the previous discussion that the binary relationship R only
says something about the relationship between to elements x,ye X. Thus the
relationship R can not be used directly to say something about the order of, say, the
set of elements XK = (xl' X2' X3' X4' xs). But, it is obvious that indirectly and with
the help of some elaboration, a complete order can be established. The more extensive
a set is the more elaboration is needed to establish the order of the set for a given
consumer. It would be almost impossible to use the relationship R directly to establish
the order for a given consumer of the universal set X. Since the complete order can be
established by R, then an order-preserving function can be derived from the
properties of R which completely orders the elements of X directly. The utility
function is such a function. Thus the utility function u(x) for all XE X says something
about the preference relationship between all the elements of X, when R only says
something about the binary relationship between the elements of X.
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814 Definition.
ff X is a set, completely ordered by a binary function R, then a mappings
u: X-49t is said to be an order-preserving function, if only if
u(x) > u(y) ¢::> xR(B)y,
u(x) = u(y) ¢::> xR(E)y,
where x,y E X.
Note that the choice space X now can be assumed to be completely ordered by
the ordering relation R which have the properties set forth in axioms S6, SIl, and
S12. This means among other things, that the choice sets of X, T, are sets where the
elements x are ranked according to the preferences of the consumers of the population
W. That is, it follows that the choice sets can be viewed as ordered sets of elements
which contain a best element that will be chosen by each consumer. Since the
mapping u maps this ordering of elements from a point in the space 9tI,to a number
in 9t in such a way that the rank among the elements of each choice set is contained,
this mapping is called a utility function which associates with every point in X a real
number, so that a point which is preferred to another gets a higher value, while
equivalent points get the same value. We call the value u(x) a utility. In a subset, or
choice set, McX, the best element has the highest utility. From one particular utility
function many others can be derived. Hence, a utility function is not uniquely
determined. Thus, a utility function only indicates order and it does not measure
intensities, that is, it constitutes an "ordinal scale".
We have so far used the axioms of choice to defme an order-preserving function.
9 A mapping u of a set X into a set ~ (u: X-+~) is a law that connects with every xe X at
least one element u(x)e~.
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The existence of such a function for all consumers concerned can be proved if some
technical assumptions are made10:
SIS Theorem.
There exists a quasi-concave and continuous function
where u(x) ~ u(y), if xRy and u(x) > u(y), if xR(B)y,
x >Y~ u(x) > u(y),
x ~ y ::) u(x) ~ u(y), if x,ye X.
Theorem S15 is not proved here. For proof see among others, Weddepohl
(1970).
Since the binary relationship R does not say anything directly about the universal
preference relationship between the elements of X, only something about the binary
preference relationship, it can not be used directly to decide which elements of a
consumer' s choice set M that is the greatest element or the preferred choice.
10 These technical assumptions are:
The axiom of continuous preferences: xRy 1\ yRz => 3a: OSaS 1 1\ yR(E)ax+(l-a)z.This
axiom says there exists a relation R on X which have the property that it is always
possible to form a combination of x and z such that the consumer is indifferent between
this combination and y. It is reasonable to assume that the consumers behave according to
this axiom. If they did not, we would observe that if xRy 1\ yRz, than there would be no
possible combination of a choice x, that is at least as good as y, and of z, which is not
better than y, that are at least as good as y. Since y is not better than x, and not worse
than z, this would seem strange.
The axiom of weak satiation: xR(E)x+t 1\ t ~ O => '11£ > O, 3i.. > O:[yeB£(x) =>
y+i..tR(E)y+(i..+l )t).The axiom states that if addition of t to x is not appreciated, then
after addition of some t to any alternative y, a new addition of t is not appreciated either.
It can be said that the consumer is satiated with t, given x.
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However, the utility function is a universal representation of the preference
relationship between all the elements of the choice space, and more specifically,
between the elements of a given consumer' s choice set M. The greatest element of a
choice set will, therefore, be given by the utility function simply by finding the
element that has the highest utility for a given choice set M. This element is the
preferred choice. Thus the tenn utility maximizing behaviour.
2.6 Price-income space.
A consumer can not pick whatever element he chooses from his choice set
Every element x=['I',xJ]e McX consists of I coordinates or products where the
members of the population of producers B produce the I-l alternatives of the
differentiated product 'If. The general product XI is produced by a different population
of producers which do not interact with the population of consumers W.
Consequently the price of the general product is given and fixed for the members of
W. But the population of consumers W interact with the population of producers of
'If. We will return to how the members of the population of producers B set their
prices, but we reveal that they are constrained to choose a price from the set of prices
C. Since each member of the population W has a given income included in the set C
and since every choice implies a price, every consumer can only choose that
alternative or element which is obtainable given his income and the set of prices he
faces.
Since the choices of the consumers is dependent upon the prices set by the
producers and since the producers set their prices after assessing the preference
positions of the products in the population W, the choice of product by the consumer
and the choice of price of the producer is an intertwined process which we shall
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describe and analyse.
We are now going to introduce prices and income, and therewith constrain the
choices open to the consumers of the population W.
Let d' be the set of all possible prices of the i-tb alternative of the commodity '"
or the price of commodity xI' Let the set ~+ 1, be the set of
all possible disposable incomes. Then ci'e d' and me ~+l" and
then
1+1
[E2] C' =Ild'
i=l
is the set of all possible combinations of prices and incomes. Prices and incomes
are always non-negative, hence C,c9t~+l.Now every point c'eC' is an I+l-vector
, [' ']c = Cl , ... ,cI ,m .
S16 Axiom.
Every member of the population of consumers W has the same income me C.
This assumption is not especially reasonable. But, it is essential for the technical
results, i.e. we would hardly be able to arrive upon an equilibrium solution for our
problem if this assumption is not to be stated. We will return later to why this is so,
but indicate that this is due to simplicity. By assuming that all consumers have the
same level of income we avoid the complicating problem of income distribution and
the implications of such a distribution for our analysis. Removing the problem of
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income distribution is not believed to have any grave implications for our results in
principle, but it simplifies the technical procedure in arriving upon a unique solution.
This assumption should thus be viewed as an assumption of technical convenience.
Using axiom S16 anotherprice-concept is derived: c=[cl,.:.,cdeC, where
~..
[E3] ci = -;;, 1=1,...,1.
This means that the points of C' are absolute prices, whereas the elements of C
are "relative" prices expressed in disposable income. The income-component is here
always set equal to 1 for all i= 1,... ,1-1, and therefore omitted, and Ci= [0,1] for all
i=I, ... ,I, i.e. all possible relative or normalized prices are between Oand 1.
S17 Definition.
C = {[Ct,... ,cI] 13c'e C': Ci=~' i=I, ... ,I}.
C is now called a price space.
It should be noted that X contains only elements which a consumer may
eventually choose. The points of C represent price and income situations, which
eventually may occur, seen from the perspective of the consumer. In fact C represents
the relative prices that are chosen by the producers, given fixed incomes.
We now distinguish the following sets of elements of X and the sets of elements
of the price space C:
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S18 Definition.
If ce C,
L(c)={xeX IcTx=1 l,
M(c)={xe X IcTxS;1l,where cT is the transpose of c.
The set M(c) contains all points or elements that can be bought at the relative
price vector c, since their value does not exceed the amount of 1.Therefore, the sets
M(c) will be named budget sets. The sets L(c) of elements that cost exactly 1will be
named budget planes. Clearly L(c)cM( c) for any ce C. IfM(c)e T then this budget
set is a choice set Hence, M(c) represents a possible choice situation for the
consumer. Thus, we introduce
S19 Definition.
C" = {ce C IM(c)e T} .
Definition S19 gives the set of prices that makes all consumer points or elements
obtainable to one or more consumers in a given population W. Since the set C
contains as elements allpossible prices that may occur, this means that there may be
prices for which no one can afford to buy one or more of the elements of the choice
space. Thus, C" gives the set of prices that makes all points obtainable to someone.
From defmition S19 it follows that
[E4] ce Co => M(c)eT,
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which means that if c is an element of CI\, then the subset M(c) is an element in
the set of choice sets. In other words, the set CI\ is the set of price vectors ce 9tI for
which all the elements of X are obtainable to some members of the population W.
Thus if the realized price vector is an element of CI\ then every element of X is eligible
for choice to some member of W. But it does not mean that every element of X will
be chosen.
S20 Axiom.
M(c)eT ~ ce CI\.
Axiom S20 says that if the subset M(c) is a choice set, then c has to be a vector
ofprices that makes the elements ofM(c) obtainable to some consumer. This is
reasonable, since a budget set M(c) is a choice set of elements that are obtainable for
some members ofW. Thus c has to be an element of CI\.
By combining [E4] and axiom S20 we get:
[E5] CI\ = (ce C IH(M(c» :F- Ø},
which says that CI\ is the set of price vectors for which the choice sets M(c) for
all c, have a greatest element. Thus, the set CI\ is the set of price vectors that secure
the existence of a set of eligible elements since a greatest element is an eligible
element. It is only among a set of eligible elements that a greatest element can be
found.
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The existence of a set of eligible elements is established. It follows from the
above axioms of choice that the consumers of the population W will choose the
greatest element of such a set open to them. We therefore turn to the question of how
this greatest element is identified. This is the question of demand.
2.7 The demand function.
A demand function is an expression of which element a consumer will choose
given the prices and the income he faces. Since we are operating through disposable
income prices C this reduces to the problem of which element the consumer will
choose given the disposable income prices.
It follows from theorem SIS that a utility function for a member of W is a
universal ordering of this member's choice set M(c), where the most preferred
element of the member's choice set has the greatest utility value. It follows from [ES],
i.e. axiom S20 and definition S19, that for CE Cl" there exists at least one greatest
element in M(c). Thus, ifM(c), CE Cl" is the choice set of a member ofW, and D(c)
denotes the demanded element or group of elements for CE CA, then the demanded
element is that element of M(c) for which the utility value is the highest:
S2] Theorem.
o o o
'r:;/CECA: D(c) = x , where u(x )=u = max u(x).
xeM(c)
Proof: Assume CE CA, then from [ES] it follows that H(M(c») '¢ø, thus there
exists a greatest element From theorem SIS if follows that any greatest
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element or group of greatest elements has the highest utility value. And from
definitions S9 and S14 it follows that the element with the highest utility is the
most preferred element in M(c). QED.
We have now completed the description of how members of the consumer
population W choose. But it follows from the previous description that the choice is
both dependent upon which sets are obtainable and which sets are eligible. Thus the
consumer will choose the obtainable and eligible element from his choice set. Which
elements are eligible can not be influenced by any action by members of the producer
population B. But these members of B set the prices and thus decide which elements
are obtainable by the members of W. The choices of the consumers can therefore be
influenced by the actions and choices of the members of B.
On the other hand, the preferences of the members of W influence the choices of
the members of B. The preferences of the members of the population W is not known
to the members of B and have thus to be assessed. Based on this assessment the
members of the population B will set their prices ce Cl' and consequently the
members ofW will make their choices, i.e. the elements xO=D(c) which will be
chosen for each member ofW. For each member i=I, ...,I-1 ofB the question is how
many members of W will choose a consumer point xO= ['1,o,x~ containing ~= 1,
xie 'P. Define the general commodity XI to include all products except the
differentiated product 'If, included savings, i.e the choice set is a budget plane L(c):
S22 Axiom.
Every choice set is a budget plane, L(c)eT.
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As a consequence ofaxiom S22, since the income is assumed to be equal for all
members of W, the quantity of the general commodity XIwill be equal to all members
who choose a particular alternative i=L,...,I-I, and every member ofW will face the
same common choice set L(c) for a given price vector CECA. Denote an element of X
that contain Xj = 1by xi. Let X~denote any value of the general good for an element
x=xi. We state:
S23 Proposition.
'VCECA => L(c)T = (x'(c), ... .x'(c), ... ,xI-1(c», where Xi(C)EX for all
i=l ,... ,I-I, for all members of W .
.frQQf: In virtue ofaxioms S3 and S22, CECA => x~=x~(c) for all i = 1,...,1-1,
and for a memberofW. But, since every memberofW has the same income
due to axiom S16, then xkc) 'VCECA has to be the same for every member of
W. Thus, every choice set is the same to every member of W, and this
common choice set L(c) for a given CECA contains /-1 elements. QED.
The implication of proposition S23 is that every member of population W will
have to choose among the same choice set L(c)cX, for a given price vector CECA.
Thus there exists as many choice sets as there are different possible price vectors.
We may now view the choice situation of every member of W as choosing an
alternative xi = (~,xb, where ",i=(Xl=O, ... ,Xi=I, ... ,XI_l=O)E'1', among /-1
alternatives included in the choice set L(c), CECA.
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Chapter 3. Outline of the problem of producer assessment».
In chapter 2 we described how consumers make their choices within the context
of discrete and differentiated markets. We note that there is no uncertainty at the hands
of the consumers. However, the underlying assumption of our model is that the
consumers make their choices after the producers have decided upon their offer to the
market, i.e. their prices, and the quantities they will offer at these prices. Hence the
sequence of actions in our model is such that all producers first and simultaneously
set prices and quantities, and then the consumers decide which brand they want to
consume, Le. every consumer decide which brand i=l, ... .l-I is xieD(c).
It is obvious that the actual demand D(c) will not be observed by the producers
prior to their own decisions. Hence consumer demand is by nature uncertain from the
point of view of producers. It is this uncertainty which is assumed away inmost of
the literature on producer behaviour in differentiated markets. We are to focus on this
uncertainty, and will show how producers, if rational, will cope with it. Finally we
will give some indications of how this uncertainty affects the equilibrium in a
differentiated market.
The actual question facing the producers in population B is how the members of
Ware distributed over the elements x'e Ltc), for all i=l, ....l-I, for a given price
vector ce CA, and for whatever information is available. This problem of the
distribution of the members of W facing the producer population B is to be the subject
of our attention in the following chapters. In the next chapter we will present and
discuss the most common approach to this problem: The logit model, which is
derived assuming that the distribution of choices is known for the population Was a
11 A part of this chapter leans to some extent on Jaynes (1957).
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whole. In the successive chapters an alternative approach is presented where the
distribution is derived using only market information,
The fundamental problem facing the members of population B is to measure the
choice of the members of W from the set X. Since the members of B do not know the
preferences of the members of W, they do not know their choices either. Thus the
members of B is confronted with lack of information, or, in an other word,
uncertainty, inmaking their own decisions.
The members of B therefore have to assess in one way or another the choices of
the consumers ofW. A useful concept in making such an assessment is the concept of
likelihood or probability, Le. how likely the occurrence of an event is, expressed in
fractions. Thus the degree of information is reflected in the probability distribution
conceived by the decision maker, Le. among the members of B. The greater the extent
of information available to the decision maker, the more concentrated the distribution.
The central question which we are to answer later is: How is the decision maker
to specify the relevant probability distribution? This problem of specification is, in
cases where little or no information is available, as old as the theory of probability.
Laplace' s "Principle of Insufficient Reason" constitute an attempt to supply a criterion
of choice in which one said that two events are to be assigned equal probabilities if
there is "no reason to think otherwise". However, except in cases where there is an
evident element of symmetry that clearly renders the events "equally possible", this
assumption may appear just as arbitrary as any other criterion. Consider the following
example submitted by Borch (1968): View the effect of the outcome of a political
election, say, in Britain on the exchange rate. The crucial factor is if Labour gets a
majority or not There can be three outcomes in the election: Labour wins, the
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Conservatives win, or the Socialdemocrats win. In this case Laplace's principle
assigns a probability of 1/3 to each event. However, if the problem is structured as 10
the relevant events "Labour gets a majority" or "Labour does not get a majority",
Laplace's principle would assign a probability of 1/2 to the event that Labour wins the
election. However, this contradicts the fact that we first assigneda probability of 1/3
10 the same event using the same principle.
Therefore, since Laplace, this way of formulating such problems has been
largely abandoned, mainly because the lack of any constructive principle which would
give the decision maker reason for preferring one probability distribution over another
in cases where both agree equally with the available information.
For further discussion of this problem, one must recognize the fact that
probability theory has developed into two different "schools" as regards the
fundamental notions. The "objective" school of thought regards the probability of an
event as an objective property of that event, always capable in principle of empirical
measurement by observation of frequency ratios in a random experiment. In
calculating a probability distribution the objectivist believes that he is making
predictions which are in principle verifiable in every detail. The ultimate test of a good
objective probability distribution is : Does it correctly represent the observable
fluctuations of the variable of interest, Le. x?
The "subjective" school of thought regards probabilities as expressions of
human ignorance. Thus the probability of an event is merely a formal expression of
our expectation that the event will or did occur, based on whatever information is
available. In the eyes of the subjectivist, the sole purpose of probability theory is to
help us in fonning reasonable conclusions in cases where there is not enough
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information available to lead to certain conclusions. Thus detailed verification is not
expected. The test of a good subjective probability distribution is: Does it correctly
represent our state of knowledge as to the value of x?
It should be evident that the assessment problem facing the producers arise as a
consequence of the producers ignorance as to the actions of consumers. This is the
reason why producers have to make assessments. Hence any probability distribution
used by any producer has to be viewed as this particular producers subjective
assessment of the uncertainty he faces.
It should be recognized that the theories of subjective and objective probability
are mathematically identical. But the concepts themselves cannot be united. In
analysing human economic behaviour, and the involvement of probability in the
modelling of the assessment made by a group of economic agents of the steps taken
by an other group of economic agents, we have to adopt the subjective point of view.
The subjective point of view is certainly one of the fundamental ideas behind the
model presented in this treatise. Our idea is that since the producers of B face
uncertainty or lack of information they have to assess the probability distribution of
choice based on the information available to them about the preferences of the
members of W and the prices they themselves decide upon. It should be evident that
the subjective thought is fundamental to our analysis.
This having been said it should be noted that producers are not expected to set
their probability distributions randomly. Assuming rational behaviour one expects to
observe that the producers analyse the situation, and, based on the available
information, decide which distribution to use. It is this analysis we are to model in the
subsequent chapters.
Since any probability distribution is assumed to be based entirely on the
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information available to the producers as to how consumers will react, we are to
discuss and state what information it is reasonable to assume that the producers will
possess.
Let Q denote the information set of the i-th member of B. The question we will
have to ask is: What relevant information is it reasonable to assume that the producers
will possess? Surely any member of B know how his fellow producers determine
their offers in the market. We assume this procedure is the same for every producer,
and that every producer knows this. Furthermore it is reasonable to assume that the
producers know how the consumers make their choices, but of course not which
choice they make, Le. the principles guiding the consumers in making their choices
are included in the information set Usually the producers will have access to
historical information of some kind The question remains how relevant such
information is. The only historical information which can be said to have direct
relevance to the assessment problem facing the members of a particular industry is the
historical market information for the industry. This information gives a sort of
feedback to the industry members and ought therefore to be considered relevant.
Among other possible historical information is information regarding the whole
economy, such as inflation, and expected growth rates. However, how relevant such
information is for a particular industry is difficult to say, and this sort of information
is also usually embedded in the historical market information in some way.
Furthermore, such firm specific information as marketing effort and brand
quality, in addition to the information provided by market surveys, should be
considered relevant. As we will show in chapter 8, such information can easily be
comprised by our model. However, this sort of information is not included in our
basic model, which we are now to derive, since we will in the following chapters
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focus on how producers assess consumer demand and market equilibrium. When
these issues are concluded, we will in section 8.1 extend the information set to
account for a broad range of relevant information, and show that our basic results
concering producer assessment and market equilibrium also applies to the extended
information model.
S24 Axiom.
The information set Qi = Q for i=I, ...,I-l, and contains:
1. The principles of producer behaviour which will be stated below.
2. The principles of consumer behaviour which are stated above.
3. Market information for the previous periods the industry has been in
operation.
The market information for previous periods is represented by the transactions
and the prices that materialized in different periods. The transactions of the last
foregoing period t-1 is expressed ni,t-l ' for all i=l, ... .l-I, where 2, ni,t-l = N,
i
where N is the total number of consumers in population W. The market share of finn
i in period t-1 is ~t-l = ni,t-llN. The price information for the previous period t-I is
expressed by Ci,t-)for all i=l, ...,I-l.
The market information can be represented by an expected industry price level
for the present period:
[E6] c = 2, di,t-l'Ci,t-l'
l
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Now the question is how this information is to be used by the members of B to
assess or measure the demand from the members of W. Specifically this is the
problem of measuring the choices of the members of W from the choice space X.
However, only measurable events can be measured. Hence we Will have to assure the
existence of a measurable space of events on X. We observe that the choices made by
the consumers can be classified as events. A measurable space (x,D is now defined
on X, where T is called a a-algebra and is the set of all measurable subsets of X. A
measurable subset is a set of X which is capable of being measured in some way. The
measure we apply is probability. Let p(r IQ) denote a probability distribution over the
measurable space. The subjective probability distribution of any member of B is
defined:
S25 Definition.
p: (X,r)~p(r IQ), such that p(X) = l.
Thus the measurable space (Xf") is the space of subsets or events capable of
being assigned a probability. The space of all possible probability distributions p(r)
over (Xf") is called the probability space, and is denoted (X,r,p).
We note that axiom S3 directs that the consumers can choose only one brand and
one item of this brand. Consequently the measurable subsets of r have only one
element, i.e. one of the alternatives xie L(c), i=L, ... ,I-l, ce C". Every producer
recognizes that L(c)c(X,D for a given ce C". The producers observe that for a given
price vector ce C" the probability distribution which they seek is the distribution of
the N members of Waver the L(c), i.e. pe 9tI-\ P=[Pt>..·,pi,... ,PI-d where Pi =
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p(xie D(c) IQ,c) 'V i=L,...,I-l. Accordingly we observe that the probability space
(Xr,p)e 9tI-1 is the set of all probability distributions that can be assigned to all the
possible choice planes for every ce O'.
As we postulate that this procedure is being observed by all producers we
conclude that the assessment problem of the members of B is to decide upon which of
the probability distributions that are included in (X,r,p) they are to use in measuring
demand from the consumers. The answer to this question is in principle that the
members of B should use the probability distributionwhich conforms best with the
information set, and which does not take in to account any other information than the
information that is included in Q. Subsequently the question is: Which element of
(X,r,p) do conform best with the information included in Q? This problem is to be
the objective of the discussion in the next two chapters.
Finally it should be recognized that the questions stated above coincide with the
question stated in connection with the test of subjective probability. Hence every
producer will have to pick out the probability distribution that he believes best
represents his ignorance as to how the members of W will choose. To answer this
question we have to describe how producers, if rational, would behave in a discrete
and differentiated context. An analysis of how producers behave in such a context,
involving the problem of assessment of consumer behaviour and strategic
considerations, is the theme of chapters 6 and 7.
It should be noted that from definition S25 a kind of "expected" price level can
be calculated, using the prices that will be set, and the probabilities assessed by the
producers, i.e. c =L PrCi' where Pi is the probability that an arbitrary consumer will
i
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choose brand i.However, c and c are not in principle identical since c is a bit of the
information that is used to derive Pi and hence ci for all i=L,...,I-l, and since c is a
maximum accepted price level and hence not necessarily equal to C in any case.
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Chapter 4. Previous models and logit.
4.1 Introduction.
The producer's problem of assessing demand in a differentiated and discrete
context, Le. the question of which element of (Xr,p) that conform best with Q, is a
problem which has not been solved nor focused in the litrature. However, some
attention have been given to the isolated problem of how consumer demand in a
discrete choice context is to be represented from the analyst's point of view.
When analysing consumer demand in isolation in a discrete choice context
several analysts have turned to the so called random utility model. The most
prominent is perhaps McFadden (1974, 1975) using the logit model, but also
Berkovec & Rust (1985), Bos (1970), Borsch-Supan (1987), Cameron (1984), Li
(1977), Train (1980,1986), and others, use this approach.
These models deal only with how demand as such is to be represented by analyst
in a discrete choice context. However, one may identify the analyst's problem with
the producer' s assessment problem. Then the random utility model may be assumed
to be applied by producers in assessing the demand from consumers in a
differentiated and discrete context.
The most prominent contribution dealing with the whole problem of interaction
between consumers and producers in a differentiated and discrete market is made by
Anderson, de Palma & Thisse (1992). In short, Anderson et al assume the consumers
10 behave according 10 the so called random utility maximizing behaviour, and the
demand is consequently represented by an expected demand function using logit to
describe the underlying probability distribution. A population of producers are
introduced and an equilibrium is derived. Anderson et al (1992) do not explicitly
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assume that the producers believe the consumers to behave according to the random
utility model. However, in our context this is the essential consequence.
In the folIwing sections we will briefly discuss this approach to the assessment
problem and in panicular analyse how the random utility model conform with the
information in Q.We will show that such a model will not be used by the producers
since it assumes the existence of additional information not included in Q. A model
based on such fundamental notions as random utility have also to be regarded as
controversial.
We will first of all give a short presentation of the random utility approach, and
what assumptions that have to be made to arrive at a probability distribtuion over L(c)
that can be used by the producers. Some of the properties of this distribution is
pointed out, and finally we show that the producers acting rationally, will not use this
approach to their assessment problem since it assumes that the producers have
knowledge of how the preferences of the consumers are distributed. Such information
is not included in the inforamtion set Q.
4.2 Random choice.
The random utility theory is based on the above referred axioms of consumer
choice, with an additional assumption of importance. This additional assumption is
that there is a random element in the utility function representing the consumers
preferences. The motivation for introducing this random element seems to be the
analyst's problem of uncovering the factors influencing the choice of a given
consumer.
The utility of a choice of xie L(c), ce CJ\, to a member n of population W is:
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[E7] lime= u(xieL(c», V'i=l, ...,I-l, V'neW, V'ceO".
A consumer n is maximizing his utility if and only if he chooses alternative i •
that is xi = (~.xb, if and only if uine> uine' V'j=l, ... ,I-l, j:~i, fot a given ce C".
We will now introduce a random element into the utility index [E7]. This
introduction of a random element is due to different reasons. It is argued that from the
analyst's point of view the choice of any consumer seems to be random, when
dealing with discrete choice from the set X. Since a consumer only chooses one
alternative from a set of alternatives a small change in price, income. preferences or
attributes of an alternative may cause a fundamental change in the demand from the
consumer in population W, in contrast to what we expect to find in the continuous
case. Thus we may experience unforeseen and discrete jumps in demand which seem
to be generated by random preferences. An other argument forwarded by some
researchers is that the preferences of the consumers are truly random. That is, the
consumers do not know themselves which alternative they prefer until the moment
they actually make the choice.
The idea is that the utility index [E7] consists of a deterministic component and a
random component:
[E8] uin = vin + Ein, V'i=l, ... ,I-l, V'ne W, for a given ce C",
where Em is a random variable.
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[ES] says that the utility function of every member of W is stochastic.
Next we introduce the notion of a representative consumer by assuming that the
deterministic component, vin' is equal for all ne W for a given ce-CA:
[E9] uin = Vi + Ein' 'v'i=I, ... ,I-I, 'rIne W, for a given ce CA.
In [E9] Vi is a value that is equal to the population of consumers as a whole, and
Em is an individual stochastic utility value.
It now becomes impossible to determine with certainty which alternative a given
consumer will prefer since the consumer's utility index is stochastic. The only
measure that can be forwarded is the probability that a consumer will choose a
particular alternative. The concept of probability is already defined. The choice
probability, that is the probability that a member of W will choose a particular
alternative, is denoted by Pi(c), i= l, ...,I-I, for a given ceCA. Within the context of
the theory of random utility the choice probability may be interpreted as the
probability that Um>Ujnfor all i= l ,... ,I-I, jei, for a given ce CA, that is, the marginal
utility of alternative i is greater than any other alternative:
[EIO] Pin(c) = prob(uin>ujn for all i=l,oo.,I-I, j:;t:i,ce CA).
From [E9] and [EIO] we derive
[ElI] Pin(c) = prob( vi - Vj> Em - Ejnfor all i=l,oo.,I-I, j:;t:i,ce CA).
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Since Em, E.j1'l'for all i=L,....l-I, jei, are stochastic values, the difference is also
stochastic.
Since allmembers of W are guided by the same principles when their
preferences are formed it is not unreasonable to assume that the distribution of the
stochastic component is the same for every member of W:
[E12] F(En) = F(E) 'VneW.
F(En) denotes the distribution of the stochastic component for the n-th member
ofW.
From [Ell] and [E12] we derive the probability that a consumer will choose
brand i if the price vector is ce CI\:
00
[E13] Pi(C)= J (Ej< Ei+ Vi- Vj' j= l ,... ,I-l, j:Jl!:i,ce CI\)dF(E), 'Vxie L(c),
~=......
'Vce CI\.
IfF(E) is known then the choice probabilities Pi for all i=L,....l-I, can be
computed.
4.3 The loeit model.
[E13] is the general expression derived using stochastic utility maximization. A
meaningful interpretation and computation is denied us, however, if we do not know
the functional form of F(E), the general distribution of the stochastic utility
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component.
The most frequently assumed distribution for the stochastic component is the
extreme value distribution and the normal distribution. Of these the extreme value
distribution is the most used according to Train (1986). If the stochastic component is
assumed to be distributed by the extreme value distribution then the resulting model
for the choice probabilities expressed by [E13] is the logit model.
The extreme value distribution is defined as follows:
826 Definition.
The extreme value density function for every q, i=I, ... ,I-I, is given by
exp {Ed-exp]-exp {Ed], where exp[ -exp (Ed] is the cumulative distribution.
Ifwe now assume that the preferences of the consumers are distributed by the
extreme value distribution:
[EI4] F(E) = exple.l-expl-expl e.I], for i=I, ... ,I-l.
If [E14] is inserted into [E13] this will result in the logit model:
Assume that q takes on a particular value, cp. It then follows from [Ell] that the
probability that alternative i is chosen is equal to the probability that Ej<CP+vi-Vjfor all
j=I, ,I-I, j*i. The probability that Ej=CP,and at the same time Ej<<p+vi-Vjfor all
j= 1, ,1-1, j=i, is the density of Ejevaluated at cp multiplied by the cumulative
distribution of every Ejwith exception of Ejwhich is evaluated at CP+vi-Vj'If defmition
S26 is applied we may write p(Ej=CP1\ Ej<CP+vi-VjV'j=I, ... ,I-I, j~)
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= exp(-q»exp(-exp(-q>))II exp(-exp(-q>-Vi+Vj»' But, since vi-vi=O, we write
j,j*i
[EIS] P(£i=q>" £j<q>+vi-Vj'v'j=I, ... ,I-I, j*i) = exp(-q»IIexp(-exp(-cp-vi+Vj»'
j ,
We know that the stochastic component q does not have to be equal to q>.q can
take on any value for which it is defined. The right-hand side of the expression in
[E13] may thus be expressed as the sum of all values of q>:
00
[E16] Pi = J exp(-q»II exp(-exp(-q>-vi+Vj»dq>.
q>=-oo j,j*i
An evaluation of the integral gives
00
[E 17] Pi = J exp( -q» {-exp( -cp)l exp( -q>-Vi+Vj)}dq>.
<p=-oo j
We now substitute exp(-q» with <1>,then -exp(-q»dq>= d<1>and dq>= -(d<1>/<1».
These expressions are now inserted into [E17]:
exptv.) .
[E18] Pi = , for all r=l ,... ,I-1.L exp(v)
j
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Thus the logit model is derived based on especially two crucial assumptions,
which is not to be found in traditional analysis of economic behaviour:
1.The utility function of a member ofW has a stochastic element.
2. The stochastic utility element is extreme value distributed.
The assumption regarding the existence of a stochastic utility element is to some
extent discussed above. It is mainly due either to a practical way of analysing the
particular problem of discrete choice, or to the belief that the utility function is in fact
stochastic to some extent.
The assumption that the assumed stochastic component is extreme value
distributed is mainly due to the fact that this assumption generates choice probabilities
that are easily interpreted and computed. How reasonable this last assumption is we
are to elaborate on to some extent below.
An implicit assumption that follows from the assumed extreme value distributed
stochastic component, is that the stochastic utility component has a mean value of
zero. The deterministic component vi is thus characterized as the representative utility
or the expected utility.
The logit model of choice probability has three important characteristics:
The first to be mentioned is that every choice probability has a value between O
and 1: OS Pi Sl, for all ie l, ...,I-l. This characteristic implies that if an alternative is
not strongly sought after, then the expected utility will approach -00, and the choice
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probability will subsequently go towards zero.
The second characteristic of the model is that the probabilities add up to one.
The third characteristic says that the relationship between the choice probability
of alternative xie L(c), and the expected utility of alternative xieL(c) is simoid, i.e. S-
curved. This implies that if the expected utility is small compared to the other
alternatives, then the choice probability of alternative xieL(c) will respond only in a
very limited way to an increase in the expected utility of this alternative. The
interpretation of this is that if an alternative is not at all preferred, than a marginal
change in its status does not increase its likelihood of being chosen. This seems
reasonable.
The three above mentioned characteristics should be considered reasonable for
an economic model. But, the model has a fourth characteristic which also can and
should be discussed. This characteristic we label independence from irrelevant .
alternatives.
S27 Definition.
When the relationship between two choice probabilities Pi and Pj, for all
ij=l, ... ,I-l, are dependent upon the alternatives alone, then these
probabilities are independent from irrelevant alternatives.
That the logit model of choice probabilities are independent of irrelevant
alternatives is easily shown. Study the relationship between Pi and Plc:
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We observe that the relationship between these two probabilities does not depend
on other alternatives then x', xke L(c). This implies that the relationship between these
choice probabilities is constant and independent of the other elements ofL(c).
The Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives characteristic could be considered
reasonable in some situations, and obviously unreasonable in others. This can be
illustrated by an example constructed by Train (1986):
Consider that a traveller has to choose between using his own car or riding a red
coloured bus. Assume that his deterministic utility component is equal for using the
car or taking the red bus. The choice probabilities for using the car or taking the red
bus are computed to Poc = Prb = 0.5 using the logit model. This seems reasonable.
We now introduce a third alternative, a blue bus. Assume that the traveller's
deterministic utility components for the red and the blue bus are equal. This implies
that PrVPbb = 1. We already know that Prb/Poc = 1. The only probability that satisfies
these liA conditions are Poc = Prb = Pbb = 1/3. Obviously we would expect the
probability of choosing his own car to be the same before and after we introduce a
substitute to the red bus. That is, we would expect Poc = 0.5 and Prb = Pbb = 0.25.
Thus the Independent of Irrelevant Alternatives characteristic of the logit model
underestimates the choice probability of the own car alternative.
4.4 Random utility and market equilibrium.
The problem analysed in this treatise is the modelling of the interaction between
consumers and producers in a differentiated market of discrete choice. This problem
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has been addressed by some other authors, primarily Anderson, Palma & Thisse
(1992). Anderson et al approach the problem using the logit model to represent
consumer behaviour. Thus they assume that the utility indexes of the consumers are
stochastic, and that the distribution of the stochastic element is extreme valued. This
may be arguable, but one thing is certain: It is not a general principle that the tastes of
the consumers are extreme value distributed. The use of the extreme value distribution
is obviously a choice, not a result derived from general accepted axioms. Hence this
assumption cannot be regarded as a fact an included in the information set Q of the
producers. This at least excludes the logit model as a starting point in the discussion
of the actual problem.
The starting point should be fundamental assumptions about consumers' and
producers' behaviour, and from these assumptions the microeconomic structure of the
problem under study should be derived. We will show in this treatise that a model that
characterizes how the consumers view themselves and their opposite numbers, the
producers, and how the producers view the consumers and their own behaviour, can
be derived from general accepted assumptions about consumer and producer
behaviour, such as utility maximizing consumer behaviour and profit maximizing
producer behaviour.
Thus, there is no need for disputable assumptions such as extreme value
distributed tastes, or random utility consumer behaviour. However, it should be
mentioned that technically the model derived in this treatise is in some ways similar to
the model derived using the extreme value distribution and random utility.
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Chapter 5. Assessment of behaviour: A discussion.
5.1 Introduction.
As stated in chapter 3, the problem facing the members of the population of
producers is to assess the distribution of the members of the population of consumers
over the 1-1 different alternatives open to them. The only information in the
possession of the producers is the information revealed above in the analysis of
consumer choice. This is known byevery member of the producer population B. This
information, however, only reveals how the members of the consumer population W
will choose in general, i.e. the principles guiding their choices. It says nothing about
the specific choices made by the consumers at given prices. Therefore, these choices
have to be assessed by the producers. It is obvious that the assessment made by the
producers has to be in accordance with the principles of consumer behaviour which
the producers know, i.e. the axioms of choice and their implications.
The assessment problem of the producers can now be stated more precisely:
Assume that the price vector CE O' is presented to the members of W by the
members of B. Then the individual member of population B has to decide on which
distribution of the members of population W over the alternatives i= 1,...,1-1 he
believes will occur as a result of the introduction of this particular price vector.
It should be recognized that the previous passage contains two important points:
Firstly it is assumed that a distribution will occur over the members ofW. This
follows from the axioms of choice. Second, each member of population B has to
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make a decision on what he believes will be the resulting distribution. This belief has
to be in accordance with the axioms of choice. Thus any distribution which satisfies
the axioms of choice could be used by some member of population B. On the other
hand, if there exists a unique an unbiased distribution which is implied by these
axioms that distribution will be used byevery member of the producer population B.
In general the problem facing the producer is a problem of allocating the
consumers to a fmite number of states, or over a fmite number of alternatives for the
given information, e.g. for CE C". This problem could be solved by 1) either
assuming that the producer knows more than we in fact are allowed to assume, Le.
that the producer knows more than what is assumed to be included in the information
set Q, or 2) by deriving a model of producer assessment based on the assumption that
the producers have only the information included in Q. In the first case it is usually
assumed that the distribution of preferences of the population W is known. This was
the case in the solution presented in the previous chapter. Of course if the producers
know both how many of the members of W that rank xi for all i=I, ...,I-l as their
greatest element, and they know the obtainable sets of the population W, the
assessment of the choices of the consumers is simple.
Nevertheless, we recognize that it is not reasonable to assume that the producers
know the distribution of the preferences of the members of W. This assumption
should therefore not be introduced. How then is it reasonable to model the behaviour
of the producers, i.e. how will the producers react if faced with this limited
information set Q?
In principle the problem facing the producers is to allocate a finite number of
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subjects over a finite number of states in accordance with a given set ofprinciples.
This is a fundamental problem which arises in several different contexts. In general it
is a technical problem of logic and thus we may tum to how this problem has been
solved in other contexts. If the logical structure of a problem in another context is the
same as the logical structure of the problem facing the members of population B, then
it can be argued that in principle the problems are identical. They differ only in the
interpretation of the elements included in the problems.
One such problem can be identified in one of the branches of physics, i.e.
thermodynamics.
5.2 The distribution of physical particles: Caroot'S problem.
Carnot (1824) was not confronted by a population of consumers which should
be distributed over a set of elements. He studied the efficiency of steam engines and
observed that heat, for no obvious reason, moved from a warm substance to an
initially colder one. Ina nutshell this is what thermodynamicsts is about: The
movement of particles within a physical system. A physical system13 in general
consists of elements. A given number of water molecules in a closed container
constitute a relevant example. The elements of any system are characterized as
particles". Any physical system will always be in a particular state at any given point
in time. The state of the system is a function of the state of the individual particles. Let
us presume that the structure of the problem of the producers of population B is
12 Thermodynamics: The study of the interrelation between heat, work and internal
energy.
13 Physical system: Any identifiable collection of physical substance which can be
distinguished from anything else through a defined surface in such a way that a change in
everything else do not change the system and its contents.
14 A particle: Molecule,atom, electron or foton.
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similar to that facing Carnot in analysing the thermodynamic conditions of a physical
system. The thermodynamical system correspond to the population W and the
particles to the individual members of W. The set of possible particle states
correspond to the set of individual choices X.
Return to Carnot's (1824) original problem of heat diffusion in a physical
system. Let a property of the system be denoted entropy. Classical thermodynamic
entropy is defined as a measure of the unavailable energy of a thermodynamic system
in a given state. In Carnot's problem initially the physical substance first was warm
only in one part, and gradually the heat diffused throughout the entire system or
substance. In the beginning the available energy of this system in the beginning was
the energy represented by the warmth of the part that was heated. Then the system
had low entropy. At a later stage when the whole system had reached an even
temperature, when the state of the system had changed, some of the previous
available energy had been transformed into unavailable energy, and therefore the
entropy was higher. It should be noted that the first law of thermodynamics says that
the energy of a system is constant. Thus a system' s energy is only transformed from
available, represented by low entropy, to unavailable form, represented by high
entropy.
The second law of thermodynamics says that the entropy of any system will
move towards its maximum, i.e. that the thermodynamical equilibrium is reached
when there is no available energy left in a system. Within the frame of Carnot's
problem this implies that there exists an entropy value for any state the system or
substance is in. Carnot described his system as consisting of, say, four particles x, y,
z and w, of which three particles, say, x, y and z were particles of high velocity, i.e.
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particles generating heat, and one particle was a particle of low velocity. Let us also
specify two possible particle states, which in a sense spatial states, where particles are
either in one part of the system denoted i or in the other part, denoted j. A system
microstate Al may now exist for which particles x, y and z are in particle state i, and
particle w in state j. In this microstate one part of the substance or system would be
perceived as hot since all the high velocity particles are ordered in one part of the
system. But now the second law of thermodynamics says that the particles to a greater
and greater extent will be distributed among the different states. Assume that driven
by the second law the system changes from microstate Al to microstate Bl where
particles x and y remain in state i,when particles z and w are in state j .Now a heat
diffusion has taken place and some of the available energy as been transfonned to
unavailable energy; the entropy value of state Bl is higher then the value of state AI.
This phenomenon can be viewed as a transformation from a higher order to a lower
order and eventually into disorder or chaos. In state Al the system is in comparative
order where all the high velocity particles are in the same state, whereas in state Bl
the high and low velocity particles are mixed together in the same state. Thus entropy
can be viewed as a measure of order.
That view is taken by a branch of thermodynamics: Statistical mechanics. In
statistical mechanics the entropy of a system as a measure of order, has to satisfy two
conditions:
l. The disorder of a microstate of the system can be measured ordinally in
relation to the disorder that exists in the corresponding macrostate.
2. The disorder of a macrostate is proportional with the nwnber of
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corresponding microstates.
In his fundamental work on statistical mechanics Boltzman (1871) states that two
arrangements of particles are in two different microstates, if and only if the particles
are rearranged from one state to another. In comparison with microstate Al above, a
microstate A2 where y, z and w are in state i and x is in j ,will be a different
microstate, but it represents the same macrostate since there are three particles in state
i and one particle in state j. Ifwe restrict the space of individual states or events X to
contain only two possible states, Le. i andj, then there exists four possible
microstates, AI, A2, A3, and A4, for a given macrostate ALPHA.
Due to the principles, marked by I and 2, above the ordinal measure of the
disorder in the different microstates and the corresponding macrostate is the number
4. In general this can be measured in the following way: If there are I-I different
states and N particles then the measure of disorder of a given macrostate is given by:
N!
[E20] T = I I I '
Zt·z2····zl_t·
where N = l Zj, and Zi denotes the frequency or the number of particles in state
i for all i=I ,... ,I-l.
In our particular example the disorder was 4. The highest level of disorder in this
particular system is 6 , i.e. a situation where there is two particles in each state, e.g.
macrostate B above. The lowest level of disorder for this system is when all the
particles are in the same state. Then T=l.
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It follows from principles 1 and 2 above that the measure of disorder has to be
derived from the value T.Boltzman thus stated entropy as
[E21] S = k-In T,
where k is Boltzman's constant", He then stated:
S28 Theorem.
S = k·N·H,
where H = -LPi In Pi' Pi = z/N.
i
!EQf;. Boltzman (1871). Let Zj~oo, for all i=L,... ,I-l. Then [E20] ~ In T
= N·ln N - N - Lzrln zi + LZj <=> -L ZjIn (z/N). Thus N·H is equal to In
i i i
T and S = k·N·H. QED.
Theorem S28 says that if T or In T is a measure of disorder, then the expression
[E22] S = -L Pi In Pi
1
is also a measure of disorder. If the event space for the population of particles is
X and the a-algebra is I', then the space (X,r,p) is a probability space for a physical
15 Boltzman's constant k= 1.38.10-16 is a fundamental physical constant.
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thermodynamic system where the number of particles is N and the number of possible
states is I-I, since p(X) =L Pi = N/N = 1. Thus PiE (X,r,p) is the probability that a
i
particle will be in state i; and the probability distribution p describes the macrostate of
the system since every Pi gives the proportion of particles that are in particle state i. It
follows from the second law of thermodynamics that the probability distribution p*
that maximizes [E22] given the constraints implied by the physical system under
consideration will constitute the equilibrium distribution of the particles of this
system:
max -L Pi In Pi
p i
[E23]
subject to the boundaries and the conditions of the system.
We recognize that Carnet's and Boltzman's problems are similar to that of the
producers in population B. The problem of Camot and Boltzman is to distribute a
given population of particles into different states. Applying the first and second laws
of thermodynamics this is done by expression [E23]. Thus there exists a solution to
the problem if additional assumptions, which are reasonable are made, such as the
first and second law of thermodynamics. The question which now raises is if there
exists a solution to our corresponding problem of economics, like the one we found
for the physical thermodynamic problem. It is emphasised that we are not looking for
an analogous solution, but we recognize that the solution of the physical problem is a
solution derived from a problem that is similar to our economic problem and that the
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solution is derived as a consequence of a description of the behaviour of the particles.
Thus we have:
1. The physical problem of heat diffusion: A population of N particles, which
are to be distributed among the 1-1 possible states of the state space X, in accordance
with specific laws of behaviour, i.e. the first and second laws of thermodynamics,
and given the conditions of the system, Le. the boundaries and other facts that are
known about the system and that defmes the population contained in the system.
Based on this information a solution to the distribution problem is derived.
2. The economic problem of assessing the choice of a population of consumers:
A population of N consumers, which are to be distributed among the 1-1 possible
alternatives of the choice space X, in accordance with specific laws of behaviour, Le.
the axioms of choice, and given the conditions of the problem or the system, Le. the
given price vector CE CA. Based on this information, is it possible to derive a solution
without stating any assumptions that is not credible?
The answer to the latter question is affirmative, and the solution to our specific
problem is in fact quite similar to the solution obtained for the physical problem. This
is not due to an analogous application of the solution of the physical problem to the
economic problem. We merely have a coincidence in methodology. But the physical
problem and its solution should be recognized as a motivator in finding the solution to
our problem. The reason why the solutions are similar is the similarity of the logical
problems. Thus one may be tempted to say that both problems are the same general
problem where the elements of the problem have different interpretations, Le. as
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particles, states, physicallaws, and boundaries and conditions of physical systems;
and as consumers, consumer points, laws of behaviour, and market information.
Strictly speaking, however, this is not the case, and the respective solutions are
deduced independently of the other problem.
We will in section 5.5 and chapter 6 return to how our economic distribution
problem is solved. We recall that our problem is how a member of B will assess the
probability distribution of a member ofW over L(c) based on the producers
knowledge about the individual behaviourofthe members ofW. Before we solve this
problem, we will present another but closely related problem, i.e. the problem of how
to distribute the population of W not assuming a particular individual behaviour, but a
particular population behaviour. As will be seen the solutions to these different
problems are quite similar, and as such it is relevant to present some of the ideas
incorporated in this problem of population behaviour, but the crucial difference
remains: Our problem is a solution to a particular problem confronting an economic
agent of our model where the solution is based on assumptions of individual
behaviour, when the problem of distribution based on assumptions of population
behaviour has to be viewed more as a problem of interest in situations where
information about individual behaviour is not relevant or available, e.g. in empirical
analyses.
But due to the similarities andthe relationship between the problems we find it
appropriate to present the problem in connection with our context.
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5.3 The efficiency principle.
Erlander & Smith (1991) reveal that the efficiency principle was fust introduced
by Zipf (1949) and later formally expressed by Smith (1978), and has been developed
further especially by Erlander (1985) and Erlander & Smith (1990).
Assume the existence of a population of individuals. This population can be in
several different states. The state of each individual is described as the individual
state, e.g. a particle state or the choice of an individual member ofW. The sum of all
individual states gives the state of the population as a whole, and are described as the
population state. The population may be in a given number of states. Each possible
state represents a particular level of activity, e.g. that all the individuals have chosen
one alternative. Each population state also represents a particular cost level, e.g. the
total population expenditure. Consider two population states A and B. Assume that
the activity level of both A and B is the same. Then assume that the cost level of A is
lower than the cost level of B. The principle of cost efficiency can be defined as:
The system or the population is cost efficient if and only if the probability p(A)
that state A occurs is at least as great as the probability p(B) that state B occurs.
The most cost efficient population state is dermed as the state for which the cost
level for the population as a whole is the lowest. Cost efficient population behaviour
is dermed so that the probability that the population is in a cost efficient state is at least
as great as the probability that the population is not.
The distribution problem at hand can in general be described as follows: The
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population of consumers W can be in different individual states xieX. i=l •...•I-l.
depending on the members' choices. where X is the individual state space. On the
individual state space X a probability space (X.r.p) is defined. Notably in the context
of consumer choice among discrete alternatives. the subsets of r will be elements of
the sets L(c). which are the choice sets that contain as elements those choices that are
obtainable to some consumers. Those elements of X that are not elements of any L(c).
can not be elements of the collection of measurable subsets of (X. D. since those
elements that can not be chosen can not be measured either. In the general context the
elements of the measurable space (X.D can be perceived as the set of possible
individual states that at least one individual member of the population can be in. and
that is in fact also the definition of any L(c). given a certain cost level ce C". Now p
is defined as a measure on the measurable space (X.D=T. Now there exists a set
ps:;(x.r.p)e 9tI-1 of possible probability distributions. Since the measurable space
(X.D is identical to the choice set L(c)e 9tI-1 in the event of a particular price vector
CE C". the probability distributions are elements of9tI-1•
As a consequence of the distribution of individual members of W over the state
space a population microstate will occur where the individiual state of each member is
indicated. The set of possible microstates is denoted n,and a specific microstate is
denoted ro. If the population has N members, then 0>=[ro1,•••,ron,... ,roN]may
represent the microstate of the population where ronindicates the individual state of
the n-th member of W. The microstate being the result of a given price vector CE C"
the microstate can be denoted ro(c)=[ron(c)] where ron(c)=Dn(c), i.e. the greatest
element among L(c) for the n-th member ofW.
Let every population microstate imply a macrostate or frequency denoted
z(ro)=[zl(ro), ... ,~(ro), ... ,zI_l(ro)], where ~(ro) is the number of individuals in state i,
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or consumers ofpopulation W who have chosen element xi=D(c)eL(c) as their
greatest element L(c). The macrostate space implied by ilis denoted Z(O).
A resulting microstate represents a definite solution to the allocation problem at
hand. Thus the question is which microstate will occur given a specific price vector
ce C". The answer to this question can not be found a priori. However, one can ask
how probable it is that one will observe a specific microstate. A population state
roe O, where oeX is the set of population states, is not an element of (X]"), but a
subset of elements of (Xf"), Le. for a given ce C" IDis a subset of elements of L(c).
Thus a population state can not be assigned a probability direct, but the probability of
observing a particular population state can be derived fonn the probabilities of
observing jointly the different events of individual states which make up the
population state, such that:
I-l
[E24] p(ID)= IIPi7.;.(ro),for all peP,
i=l
where Pi = p[xi=D(c)] denotes the probablity that an individual will be in state i
given the use of probability distribution p and given the price vector ce C", and
assuming independence between Pi' Pj for all i.j=L, ... ,I-l, ht:j.
Now the more precise defmition of the efficiency principle given by Erlander &
Smith (1990) states:
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S29 Definition.
For any given activity matrix" A and cost matrix c the probability distribution
pe 9t~1 is cost efficient with respect to A if and only if for all comparable
population states'? ro,ro'e QcX it is true that
A(ro) =A(ro'), c(ro) S c(ro') ~ p(ro) ~ p(ro'),
where A(ro) is the resulting activity level, and c(ro) is the resulting cost or
expenditure level for a given microstate roe Q.
The population states ro,ro'e QcX are subsets of X. Thus the principle states
that for given prices or costs, and for a given activity level, it would be more likely to
find a distribution of individual states that implies lower total costs for the population
as a whole, than a distribution that implies higher total costs. This definition seems
reasonable. The definition is based on the general assumption that any human
population will have a tendency towards displaying economically efficient behaviour,
i.e. using as few resources as possible.
It follows from [E24] that there are several possible probability distributions of
which only one, denoted p*, can be the correct one based on the available
information, i.e. a given price vector. What the efficiency principle therefore says is
16 The activity matrix gives the activity values/attributes for the problem at hand. If the
problem is a trip dsitribution problem, the activity martix gives how each trip is to be
valued due to whatever activity is assumed to exist in the problem.
17 Comparable population states: Two population states (I), (I)'E il are comparable if they
are of the same size, Le. the number of individuals in each of the states are the same,
when the population states are generated by exactly the same populations.
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that if the population behaviour is to be efficient, then for given activity and cost
matrices the correct probability distribution p*c(Xr,p) describing this behaviour, of
all possible probability distributions pc(X,r,p), should be such that for
I-l I-l
[E25] Az(ro) = Az(ro'), cz(ro) S cz(ro') => IIpi*Zi(CO)~ IIpi*Zi(CO').
i=l i=l
In other words: The only possible true probability distributions, if the population
behaviour is cost efficient, are the distributions that satisfy [E25].
We note that the distributions of individual states z(ro)e Z(n), where Z(n) is the
set of distributions that are implied by n, are not actually known distributions but
possible distributions of individual states. If it was known which z(ro) that was true it
would be meaningless to assess probabilities.
5.4 The representation theorem for the efficiency principle.
In the previous section we laid out which behavioural conditions a population of
individuals has to satisfy in order to be labelled cost efficient. Yet we have not
provided any precise description of which probability distributions pe P satisfy
defmition S29. We will set forth in this section which class of distributions satisfy the
principle of efficient population behaviour.
The general problem can be outlined in greater detail, and it should be observed
that it is quite similar in structure to the physical problem of heat diffusion.
In general each individual of a population of individuals is to be allocated into
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one of a given number of possible states Xe 9tI,given specific activity matrix
Ae 9tEx(l-l) and cost matrix ce 9tFx(l-l). An activity matrix A consists in general ofE
attributes each having l-l values, one value for each alternative i=l, ...,I-l. A cost
matrix c consists in general of F different cost attributes each having l-l values. In
our specific problem, analysed in this treatise, the activity matrix-is in fact a vector
equal to the unity vector. The cost matrix is in fact a vector of the prices of the
members of B.
A solution" to such a general allocation problem, that is for a given pair of A
and c, denoted (A,c), is given by a specific population state or microstate oP, which
implies a population frequency or macrostate z(ro~. The solution roOis not known.
But, if it is assumed that the same population has a cost efficient behaviour, then the
probability of observing different population states roe fl can be assessed for a given
system (A,c), That is, an assessment of the probabilities that the different elements of
fl are the solutions to the specific problem at hand, Le. the probabilities p(ro), for all
roe fl are in fact the probabilities that the different elements of fl are solutions to the
problem (A,c). Therefore, the problem is actually solved by finding the probabilities
p(ro)19.The population state roo,for which the corresponding probability p(roo) is the
greatest of all probabilities is then the most probable true population state; i.e. the
most probable solution to the problem (A,c).
The correct probability p(ro) that a given population state ro is a solution to the
problem (A,c) can not be derived directly from the measurable space (X,D defined on
X. Since X is a space of individual states, the elements of the measurable space (X,I)
18 A solution in this context can be compared to the equilibrium distribution of the
particles in the physical problem of heat diffusion, see the discussion above.
19 Also the physical problem of heat diffusion was solved by finding a particualr
probability distribution that told the probability that a particle would be in a particular
state.
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are the measurable individual states. If the population state ro can be derived from
these individual states, and it can be, then a measure on the measurable space (X,I)
indirectly measure the population state.
Since pePc(X,r,p) is only one of H different possible probability distributions
there exists R different probability measures of the probabilities p(ro) for each roe n.
Since only one probability distribution of all those which are elements of P can be
said to be the true probability distribution p* over the measurable space given the
specific problem (A,c), the question is how to arrive at this distribution among all the
P distributions offered for this specific problem.
The answer is: It should be recognized that the probability distributions P
represent expressions of the behaviour of the population since the probability that an
individual member of the population will be in a particular state says something about
the assumed distribution of states among the individuals of the population and thus
something about the population. We have assumed that the behaviour of the
population is cost efficient This implies that the true probability distribution p*
expressing the true behaviour of the population has to satisfy definition S29, i.e.
equation [E25]. The set of probability distributions that do not satisfy this definition
can be excluded as possible distributions. The next question is if there exists a unique
probability distribution satisfying this principle. It will be shown below that such a
unique p*e P satisfying the principle does exist.
We will now show the existence of a unique probability distribution p* given a
specific problem (A,e).
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S30 Definition.
For any matrices Ae9tEx(l-l) and ce9tPx(l-l) the pair (A,c) is said to be c-
identifiable if and only if for each column of the transpose matrix
cT=[Cl ,... ,Cf,... ,cp], crE 9tI-1, ctE sp([ a, AT,Cl, ... ,Cf_l,Cf+l,... ,cpD 20.
Definition S30 says that the pair (A,c) is defined as c-identifiable if each column
of cT is not an element in the space of linear combinationso of the other columns in
the matrix, the unity vector aT = [1, ...,1], and the matrix AT. In other words: Each
column of the cost matrix shall be linearly independent= of all the other vectors in the
system (A,c), which implies that there exists only one solution, i.e. there exists a
unique set of cost coefficients, O = [oe]e 9tP, defining the solution of the system. In
the context of assessing consumer choice, the activity and cost matrices are vectors in
the Euclidian space 9t1X(I-l). Thus there exists a unique cost coefficient, Se 9t, which
yields the solution to the system, or the frequency solution and the macrostate z(aP)
implied by the true solution or microstate aP.
But there may exist several different sets of activity coefficients, 13, which in
combination with the unique set of cost coefficients define the solution.
20 Sp = Span: The linear span of a set in a vector space is the smallest linear subspace
containing the set.
21 Linear combination: The sum of the respective products of the elements of some set
with constant coefficients. If ~1 and ~2 are constant coefficients to the elements al and ~
of the set A, then ~1al + ~2a2 is an linear combination.
22 Linearly independent There is no linear combination of given elements that equals
zero, given that not all the coefficients are equal to zero. al and ~ of the set A are
linearly independent vectors if for the scalars ~1 and ~2 where at least one of the scalars
are different from zero, ~lal + ~2a2 '* o.
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531 Definition.
If the matrix [o, AT, eTle 9t(E+F+l)x(l-l) is of full column rank23, then (A,c) is
said to be fully identifiables',
Definition S31 says that if all column vectors in the matrix [cr,AT, cTl are
linearly independente, then there exists a unique solution, i.e. there exists a unique
set of activity and cost coefficients that give the macrostate solution z(CJl\
The following result is given by Erlander & Smith (1990) concerning the cost
efficient probability distribution p*eP for the system (A,c) given the macrostate
solution z(CJlC):
532 Theorem.
1.1f (A,c) is c-identifiable for a rational matrix A and c and any positive
probability distribution pe P, then p* is c-efficient with respect to A if and
only if there exists a unique non-negative vector Be 9t~ such that for a vector
~e 9tE it is true that
2. If (A,c) is fully identifiable then ~ is unique.
23 Full column rank: All the columns of the matrix are linearly independent.
24 Fully identifiable means that there exists a unique solution to the problem, Le. to (A,c).
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We are not going to prove the theorem but will give some indications of the
proof. The reader is referred to Erlander & Smith (1990) for a complete proof.
First we have to decide ifp* = exptc-ø +AT~ - eTa} is cost efficient. Let Z(ID},
z(ID'}eZ(O}, denoted Zand z' respectively, be two possible solutions which are such
that clz = aTz', and Az = Az'. Define log p = cø +AT~ - eTa. Now zTlog p - z,Tlog
P = zT(aa + AT~ - eTa} - z,T(aa + AT~ - eTa}, which is equal to a(clz - aTz'} +
~T(Az - Az'} + aT(cz' - cz) = aT(cz' - cz} since a(aTz - aTz'} + ~T(Az - Az'} = O as a
consequence of aTz = aTz', and Az =Az'. We now observe that if cz ~ cz', then
zTlog p - z,Tlog P ~ O since a is non-negative and therefore zTlog p - z,Tlog P
= aT(cz' - cz} ~ O. Thus cz ~ cz', Az =Az' => zTlog P ~ z,Tlog p<=>p(ID}~ p(ID'},
and consequently the fonn log p = co + AT~ - eTa<=>p = exp(eø + AT~ - eTa} is
cost efficient.
The next question is if every cost efficient probability distribution p*e P has to
be of the form p = exp(«ø + AT~ - eTa). Let z(IDO)= z be a solution, Le. the
frequency profile of the distribution of states given the population state IDOeO. It is
known that the population probability, i.e. the probability of observing this particular
population state IDO,is denoted p(OJ~ and derived from the true probability
distribution p*. It should be recognized from [E24] that the true probability
distribution p*eP can be derived from P*(IDO)if Z is known. Thus we only have to
find the cost efficient P*(OJo}.
It follows from [E24] that log p*(OJo}= zTlog p*. If p*( ID~ is to be cost efficient
with respect to A for the system (A,c), then aTz = 1, Az = a, and cz ~ 11,where a is
the activity level, and 11is the lowest level of costs of all other states with an activity
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level equal to a.The problem offinding the cost efficient p*(CJl~can therefore be
formulated as a linear programming problem:
min log P*(CJlo)= zTlog p*
z
[E26]
subject to CJTz= 1, Az = a, cz S 11.
The solution to problem [E26] is a vector z = z(CJlo)= [zl, ... ,Zj"",zI_l] which is
the true frequency distribution if the information in A, c, a, and 11is the information
which the members of the population are facing. The right hand side values a and c,
are in this problem assumed to be known. log p* is only the coefficient of the
objective function.
Erlander & Smith (1991) states that if the problem has a positive solution
ZE9t!:!, then a well known duality property of linear programming [Dantzig (1963)]
says that then there exists a scalar (lE 9t and a vector l3e 9tE such that log p*E 9t~1 ,
for a non-negative vector 5E 9t~, can be expressed:
The above mentioned duality property follows from the optimality conditions of
Kuhn & Tucker (1951). Let Z= [zl"",zI_l]' CjE9tF be column i in c, ~E9tE be
column i in A, L be the Lagrangian function of problem [E26] where A.AE9tE,
AcE9tF and AcE9t. Now the first 21-2 optimality conditions of problem [E26] are:
a, TT.
[E28] al.; = log Pi* - ~ A.A- CiAc - A.aSO, for all i=L,... ,I-1,
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[E29] :~ Zi = O, for all i=I, ... ,I-l.
If Zj >Ofor all i= 1,...,1-1, then [E28] will have to be equal to zero if both [E28]
and [E29] are to be satisfied. Then [E28] will be identical to [E27] where Aa = a,AA
= 13, and A.c = B. In reference to theorem S32 we have thus indicated that every cost
efficient probability distribution p* have to be on the form [E27].
To complete the discussion it should be noted that it has to be decided if the
system (A,c) is c-identifiable and fully identifiable if a unique solution is to exist
We observe that in principle the problem of [E26] is similar to problem [E23].
Chiefly the differences are due to the different conditions under which the problems
are solved. In [E26] the conditions are the information represented by the cost and
activity matrices. In [E23] the conditions are the properties of the system. A
reasonable question now is: Why is the solutions of the thermodynamic problem and
the problem anlysing the distribution of individuals based on assumptions of
population behaviour similar? The answer to this question will be provided in the next
section. This answer is also an element in deriving the solution to our distribution
problem based on assumptions of individual economic behaviour.
5.5 The answer: Mathematical representation of information and uncertainty.
The central question confronting a member of the producer population B is how
to assess the likelihood that a member of the consumer population W will choose his
particular offer. Every member of W know exactly which alternative he or she will
choose among the 1-1 alternatives available from the members of B given the prices
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offered. The problem of the member of B is thus a problem of lack of information.
Specifically, the problem facing the i-th member ofB is that Xj is capable of
assuming two discrete values (1) or (O), i.e. X= (xl, ... ,Xj, •••,xI_l). The
corresponding probabilities p(xi=l) = Pi and p(xi=O) =LPj are not given. The
j:;ti
relevant probability concept is the concept of subjective probability since it is the
belief of the producer i which is of interest when this producer' s actions are analysed.
Every member ofB have thus to decide upon the values of Pi, iel ,....I-I, as a
reflection of their state of knowledge. The test of a good subjective probability
distribution is therefore: Does it correctly represent the producer' s state of knowledge
as to the value of Xi?
Just as in applied statistics the crux of a problem is often how to devise some
method of sampling that avoid bias, the problem confronting a member of B is that of
finding a probability assignment which avoids bias, while agreeing with whatever
information is given. The question we ask is: Is it possible to find any quantity
H(pe P) which measures in a unique way the amount of uncertainty represented by
this probability distribution? The great advance provided by Shannon (1948) lies in
the discovery that there is a unique, unambiguous criterion for the "amount of
uncertainty" represented by a discrete probability distribution, which agrees with our
intuitive notions that a broad distribution represents more uncertainty than does a
sharply peaked one, and satisfies all other conditions which makes it reasonable.
This advance is reached by the successful specification of conditions for such a
measure which ensure both uniqueness and consistency, to say nothing of
usefulness. Accordingly it is a very remarkable fact that the most elementary
conditions of consistency, amounting really to only one composition law, already
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detennines the function H(pe P). The three conditions are:
(1) H is a continuous function ofp.
(2) If all Pi are equal, the quantity ~(N) = H(1/N, ... ,1/N) is a monotone
increasing function of N,where N=L ni' ni is the number' of members of W
i=l
who choose alternative i.
(3) If our information or uncertainty measure is to be consistent, we must obtain
the same ultimate uncertainty no matter how the choices are broken down. This
last condition refers, to some extent, to the problems that arise when Laplace's
principle is applied.
S33 Theorem.
The only quantity which is positive, which increases with increasing
uncertainty, and is additive for independent sources of uncertainty, is
H(pe P)= - K L Pi In Pi'
i
where K is a positive constant.
Proof: Shannon (1948). From condition (1), it is sufficient to detennine H for
all rational values Pi = n/Lnj' with ni' nj integers, i.j=L, ... ,I-1. But then
j=l
condition (3) implies that H is detennined already from the symmetrical
quantities ~(N).We can regard a choice of one of the alternatives (xj,...,xI_l)
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as a first step in the choice of one of N equally likely alternatives, the second
step of which is also a choice between n, equally likely alternatives. This
could be written
H(pe P) + LPi~(ni) = ~(Lni)'
i
In particular, we could choose all ni equal to m, whereupon the above
expression reduces to
~(m) + ~(N) = ~(mN).
Evidently this equation is solved by setting ~(N) =KInN, where by
condition (2), K>O. Substituting ~(N) = K InN into H(pe P) + LPi~(ni)
i
= ~(Lni)' we obtain the desired result, H(pe P)= k In(Lni) - k LPi Inni
i i i
= - kL Pi lnp., QED.
i
It is evident that a maximization of H(pe P) will yield a probability distribution
that is unbiased. To use any other distribution would amount to arbitrary assumption
of information which the producer does not have.
This principle of maximizing H(pe P) may be regarded as an extension of
Laplace' s principle of insufficient reason, to which it reduces in case no information
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is given except enumeration of the possibilities xi' i=I, ... ,1-1, with the following
essential difference, according to Jaynes (1957): The maximum H(pe P) distribution
may be asserted for the positive reason that it is uniquely determined as the one which
is maximally noncommittal with regard to missing information, i.e. uncertainty,
instead of the negative one that there was no reason to think otherwise, which is the
idea behind the principle of insufficient reason which says that ifwe do not know
anything then every event is equally likely. Thus the concept forwarded above
supplies the missing criterion of choice which Laplace needed to remove the apparent
arbitrariness of the principle of insufficient reason, and in addition it shows precisely
how this principle is to be modified in case there are reasons for "thinking otherwise".
This resulting principle of maximum H(pe P) which as it is shown is a unique
representation of uncertainty or lack of information, is mathematically equivalent to
the result that we get when analysing thermodynamic energy diffusion or
interestingly, when we are seeking a solution to ourproblem of the producers'
assessment of the probability distribution of the consumers over the l-l alternatives of
our market And this is the answer: The problem we seek a solution to in our case of
distributing the consumers of W over the alternatives of B is: What is the reasonable
probability distribution of the consumers of W assuming they behave according to the
listed axioms of choice? The question we ask in the case of thermodynamic diffusion
is: What is the reasonable probability distribution of the particles of the system
assuming the validity of the 1st and 2nd laws of thermodynamics? Conceptually these
questions are logically the same, where the axioms of choice and the laws of
thermodynamics, respectively, are the information available in the different cases, and
since we in this section have shown that the only unbiased and consistent measure is
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H(pe P) this measure should also appear when we consistently elaborate on these
questions.
It should be noted that the result of Shannon (1948) and the result derived when
assuming the principle of efficient population behaviour are not connected otherwise
than mathematically. As pointed out above the problem solved by Shannon was the
technical problem of finding a mathematical expression for information that was
unbiased with regard to uncertainty. As such Shannon's measure is a constructed
one. The measure derived assuming the principle of efficient behaviour is a measure
that complies with the information available. The thermodynamic case is used only to
demonstrate the problem of efficient population behaviour and is not inprinciple an
economic problem. It is basically a problem of assessment of behaviour given a
particular law of behaviour. The specific result is dependent upon that particular law,
but the derivation and the logical structure of the problems is similar.
This gives the starting point of our problem: The assessment of consumer
behaviour by the producers. Shannon' s measure H(p) is the only unbiased measure
of the uncertainty that a probability distribution constitutes, i.e. of the general degree
of information comprised in the distribution. Since the producers are to decide upon
which of the P possible distributions they will use in calculating the behaviour of the
consumers, the measure H(p) is the only consistent measure they can use in
evaluating the different distributions. However, the only acceptable distributions
which should be submitted to evaluation by H(p) are those which fits the available
information. Hence the probability distributions which are eligible for choice to the
producers, are those which contain the greatest uncertainty, Le. H(P), and at the same
time accounts for the information in the possession of the producers. These
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distributions are the only distributions that only take in to account the available
information and nothing else. The question is: How to derive the possible
distributions that is consistent with these limitations?
As will be shown below, the relevant distributions are derived by formulating
and solving a mathematical programming problem where H(P), constituting the
objective function, is maximized subjected to a number of constraints where the
constraints are formulated with regard to the available information. The solution to
this problem will be a unique probability distribution which is in accordance with the
available information, and which is unbiased with regard to the information. Hence
this distribution will be used by all producers to assess the actions of the consumers.
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Chapter 6. Producer behaviour.
6.1 Introduction.
In this chapter we shall discuss the behaviour of the producers, i.e. population
B, of the differentiated products set forth in axiom S3. Our bask-assumption
concerning producer behaviour is that every member of B seeks to maximize his
profit. This is done by determining their controlling variable, the price, considering
the information they possess.
The question of producer information is the crucial subject of our analysis. The
difference between our analysis and the analyses of those using the logit model, is
that when using the logit model it is implicitly assumed that the producers have
information about the distribution of the preferences of the population W. Our basic
point is that it is not reasonable to assume that the members ofB have such
information. This is unrealistic, and only an assumption of convenience. Hence the
fundamental objective of this treatise is to present a model where no such assumptions
are stated. That is, we shall put forward an analysis based only on reasonable and
accepted assumptions of consumer and producer behaviour.
Thus the problem facing the members of B is their lack of knowledge of
anything concerning the members of W except the knowledge of how they make their
choices, i.e. the axioms stated so far. Thus the members of B know that for a given
price vector ce C''', the choice set of every member of W will be given by L(c)e X,
containing exactly I-l elements, where every element is associated with a member of
population B. Furthermore, the members of B know that every member of W will
choose that element that has the highest utility to that particular member, and every
member of B know how these preferences are formed. But what is unknown to all
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members of population B is which particular element in L(c) that is preferred by each
and every member of population W. That is not all. No member of B knows how the
members ofpopulation W are distributed as a population over the elements ofL(c).
Thus every member of B is confronted with an uncertainty concerning the
demand he is facing for a given ce CA. Since the demand is uncertain the income and
the profit will be uncertain too. The question is then: How do a member of population
B maximize uncertain profit? The answer to this is our assumption of risk neutrality,
i.e. that the member of B is indifferent between receiving the expected profit and the
profit itself.
We have thus introduced the notion of expectation, which is based upon the
notion of probability. If therefore every member of B is to maximize the expected
profit, every member of population B also has to decide upon a probability, a
likelihood, that a member of population W will choose the element of L(c) associated
with this particular member of B. That is, every member of B has to make an
assessment of his subjective distribution p[L(c) IQ]e 9tI-1 of population W over L(c)
for a given ce CA, where Q is the information set. This assessment of
p[L(c) IQ]e9tI-1 is based on all the information that the members ofpopulation B
possess.
Then, we shall show that the producers' assessment of expected demand can be
uniquely represented by a certain class of probability distributions over the choice set
This means that there is only a unique class of distributions that satisfies the axioms
of choice and at the same time is unbiased towards the information that the members
of B have access to. Since the producers will gain nothing from using a biased
distribution with regard to the information in their possession, they will use an
unbiased probability distribution. Since, as we will show, there exists a unique class
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of distributions that are in accordance with the information held by the members ofB,
and at the same time is unbiased, this distribution will be used by all members of B
since they share the same information. Ultimatly we show that the producers'
assessment follows uniquely from the axioms stated above, accounting for a few
additional assumptions.
The probability distribution which we are referring to here is not necessarily the
same distribution that is derived using the assumptions laid down by the logit model,
or other models used to represent demand in problems of this type. But they can be
the same if these models satisfy certain assumptions.
We now turn to our characterization of how producers assess consumer demand
We take the view of a producer, i.e. a member of population B. That is, we will
try to say something about which element he expects a consumer to choose.
Therefore, the question raised by the producers is: Which element xieL(c), for all
i=I, ,I-l, will a consumer choose? Obviously a consumer will choose xi=D(c) of all
i=L, ,I-l, i.e the greatest element in the choice set M(c). Therefore, from the
producer's point of view, the question is how likely it is that xi=D(c), i=L, ...,I-l, for
an arbitrary member of W, given the information set of the producer.
6.2 Measurement of differentiated product choice behaviour.
This is the problem of the producer of how to measure which choice a consumer
is to make from the choice set L(c)e X. This problem has up to now been modelled
through the use of random utility and often specified by the logit or probit model.
These models assume that the choice behaviour of the consumer is stochastic, or at
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least the behaviour is modelled as it is stochastic. Thus, the properties of these models
have an uncertain economic interpretation. In addition these models, when used to
model a market, implicitly assume that the members ofB know the distribution of the
preferences for the population W as a whole. Such an assumption is not reasonable in
our context.
We shall, on the other hand, proceed in describing the properties of our primitive
concepts, and making no further assumptions about consumer behaviour, but only,
some we believe, easily accepted assumptions about producer behaviour, and no
fundamental assumption such as the members of B having any knowledge of the
distribution of the preferences of population W. Thus, we will show, that how
differentiated product choice behaviour is measured, follows from the properties
already set forth for the primitive concepts of our theory.
The problem can be described as follows: We assume that a member of
population W, the consumer, is in a situation where the income of each member of
population W, and all prices of all the commodities in the economy are given. Then
the vector of disposable income adjusted prices ce C" is given. For a member of
population W the choice set L(c)eX is then given. The question confronting every
mem ber of population B is which element in L(c) the member of W will choose, i.e.
which element in L(c) is in D(c) for an arbitrarily chosen member ofW? The answer
to this question can not be provided by the members of B, but every member can
make an assessment, a judgment, of how likely it is that a particular element ofL(c)
will be chosen by a member of W.
We recall that every consumer or member of W in fact chooses an element or
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consumer point from the choice space X. An element XEX is a vector
x=[VT,xy], where VE 'PE 9tI-1, and xIE XIE 9t We recall that as a consequence of
axiom S22, where it is assumed that every choice set is a budget plane, for a given
price vector CEC" the value of xI is given if the mem ber of W has made a particular
choice, Thus the value of xI is implied byevery choice made from 'P. Let X~XI be
the amount of the general commodity implied by the choice of ~E 'P. Thus
~E 'P=>xi=[~,xbE X, and for a given price vector CEC" supplied by the population
B, every consumers' choice set L(c)cX contain at mostI-} elements that are eligible
for choice.
From theorem S15 producers know that every element in X is assigned a utility
value by each member ofW. It follows from theorem S21, since L(c) is a budget
plane, that the element ofL(c) for which the utility value is the highest will be chosen
by the consumer. Seen from the perspective of the members ofpopulation B, they
only know the criteria of choice for the members of W from the choice set L(c), not
which element they will choose. Consequently the choice has to be measured by each
memberofB.
Since the members of B have to measure the choices made by the members of
W, a measurable space of consumer choices has to exists. We assumed in defmition
S25 that the choices of the consumers are measured by probailities. Hence every
producer will assess the corresponding probability for every element in L(c). It
follows from defmition S25 that the probabilities are set based on the information
available to the producers. From axiom S24 it follows that the information set is equal
to all members of the industry B, and that the information set Q contains the principles
of producer behaviour, and hence how the producers set their prices, the principles of
consumer behaviour, and the market information of the previous market period.
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Nothing else is known.
Then since ce C" => L(c)e 9tI-1 for all members of population W, it follows that
p[L(c) IQ]e 9tI-1for a given ce Cl'. also is an discrete distribution. The members ofB
are therefore seeking a correspondence:
[E30] 'Vce CA, p: L(c) -+ p[L(c) IQ]e 9tI-1,
where p[L(c) IQ]e 9tI-1 is the set of probabilities corresponding to the choice set
L(c) for any member ofB.
Our objective is to characterize the function [E30] which will be identical for all
members ofB. It follows from [E30] that pi(c)ep[L(c) IQ]e9tI-1 corresponds to
xie L(c) for a given ce CA, for all i=I, ...,I-l. pi(c)e p[L(c) IQ]e 9tI-1 can be
interpreted as the probability that a randomly chosen member of W will choose
xie L(c). Theorem S21 implies that the choice probability Pi(c) for all i=L, ... ,I-I, is
the probability that the utility value of xie L(c) is greater than the utility values of all
other alternatives:
The values p[L(c) IQ]e 9tI-1 for a given ce CA is found when the question of
how probable is it to observe u[xi] > u[,J] for all,Je L(c), i~, is answered.
Equation [E31] is the equivalent of equation [EIO] of chapter 4. When we in
chapter 4 developed equation [EIO] into [E13], and eventually into the explicit
expression of [EI8], using [Ell], [E12], [EI4], and [EIS] in addition to the axioms
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of chapter 2, we are now in a position to show that it is possible to arrive at an explicit
expression of the choice probability distribution with the use of the axioms of chapter
2 with the addition of a few easily accepted assumptions.
Let us enter the mind of a member of population B. The task of every member of
B is to assess the probability distribution p[L(c*) IQ]e 9tI-1 for a given c*e CI\. The
process of assessing this distribution consists of checking a possible distribution
against the information set Q, Le. one checks if a distribution is consistent with the
principles of consumer behaviour. This being the case, one proceeds to check if it
also conforms with the given c*, i.e. producer behaviour, and eventually the market
information. The set of distributions which are consistent with the information are the
distributions which are eligible for choice.
First, let us consider what implications the principles of consumer behaviour
have for which distributions that can be used by the members of B. To consider these
implications, c* is for a moment neutralized by setting ci = V for all i=l, ... ,I-l,
h V . Thi l' h 1 i I-lW ere IS a constant IS unp les t at XI="'=XI= ... =xI .
Now the producers observe that the information in the principles of consumer
behaviour imply the following for the distribution p[L(c*) IQ] for every member of B:
1) Axiom S7 implies that Pj ~ Ofor all i,j=I, ... .l-I, where Pjep.
2) The assumption of transitivity in S7 and convexity in S13 imply by
themselves nothing concerning the choices of the members of W.
3) Axiom S12 implies that it is more likely to observe the choice of an element
94
which contains a greater amount of one commodity then all other elements in
L(c), and containing no less quantities of other commodities.
Thus axiom S12 alone has any valid implications for the shape of the distribution
p[L(c*) IQ]e 9tI-1 for a given c*. Since ci = V for all i=I, ....l-L'it follows from
proposition S23 that every commodity is represented in the same quantity in every
element of L(c*). Since every ~ serves the same purpose to the consumer and every
.. ,i . ed b . . 1 l-Land si l i I-l th bl'I' ISrepresent y one umt, 1= ,... , - , an SlOceXI=... =XI=... =XI, e pro em
appears completely symmetric to the producer. Thus every producer will identify
p[L(c*) IQ]e 9tI-1 over L(c*) with the uniform distribution.
This argument can be elaborated further. It is known to every member of B that
every xeL(c*) is different, since from axiom S3 xi=[~,x~]e L(c*), ~e 9tI-l, where
",i=[Xl=O, ,Xi=I, ... ,XI_l=()]' and x~9t, and then at least in principle ~~vi,htj,
for all i.j=I, ,I-l. This difference may in principle be ofimportance to a member of
w. Assume for a moment that c* is the price vector that makes x~= Ofor all
xie L(c*), i= 1,... ,1-1. In that case every element of L(c*) contains only the products
of the members of B. Although a member for B recognizes that a member of W may
prefer an element x', in this case Xi,to an element xi, that is Xj' the reverse situation is
also possible. Based on the available information any member of B will in this case
recognize that every element could be preferred to any other, and there is no
information whatsoever that renders any element more likely to be chosen than any
other. Thus every member for B will assign equal probability ofbeing chosen to
every element of L(c*). This implies that every member of B views the fact that an
element contains a particular alternative Xj, as no information of relevance to the
members of B, since no member can in any way use this fact to assess the choice of
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an arbitrary member ofW. Thus the members ofB are neutral towards the faet that a
particular element contains xi for all i= 1,...,1-1, hence the uniform distribution is
specified:
S34 Axiom.
'Ip.! C 1 i I-l [ i D()] (1 1)-1 i i e. allv ce ", XI = "'= XI = .. , = XI => P X = c = - , XjCX, lor
xie L(c), i=L,...,l-l.
Axiom S34 is similar to Laplace's "Principle of Insufficient Reason". The crucial
difference is that a uniform distribution is only assumed if there exists a strong
symmetry in the information concerning the different alternatives.
Since the probabilities are subjective for the members of B, it is reasonable to
assume that a producer confronted with a situation where it is not possible to say
anything about the preferences of the members of W will assign equal probabilities to
every alternative in a case where the information concerning each and every alternative
is symmetric. Thus axiom S34 has to be seen as very reasonable.
Some may even argue that axiom S34 follows as a theorem from our
assumptions and from defmition S25. But this is not entirely convincing. In principle
every distribution which fits the information set can be assigned to L(c). Thus the
question of which distribution will be chosen when there is no relevant information in
the information set, has to be answered through an axiom.
Considering every possible price vector c*e C", from axioms S12 and S34 and
proposition S23, and definition S25, we now arrive at the following result:
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S35 Theorem.
For all xi, xie L(c), ij=I, ... ,I-l, i*j, for a given ce Ø\
ci S Cj ~ p[xi=D(c)] ~ p[xi=D(c)].
Proof: Assume c, S Cj' Axiom S34 says, for xf = "'= x~== ... = x~-1~
p[xi=D(c)]ep(c) = (1_1)-1,x~xi, for all xie L(c), i=L,....I-I. Proposition
S23 says, ci S Cj ~ x~~ xi. Since axiom S12 is contained inQ and says that
x' ~ xi ~ u(xi) ~ u(xi), it follows from definition S25 that, ci S Cj ~ x~~ xi
~ p[xieD(c*)] ~ p[xieD(c*)], for all i=l ,....l-I. QED.
Theorem S35 says that since the choice set is in L(c) the price vector c
determines x~completely. And since the axiom of monotonicity says that Uj~j if x~~
xi all other factors equal, this implies that p(u?) ~ p(uJ). Therefore, the probability
distribution for a consumer over the /-1 alternatives has to satisfy theorem S35.
The producers are not interested in one consumer's choice alone. Their focus is
on the whole population of consumers, denoted W. Theorem S35 is by nature general
and valid for all consumers. Thus it is valid for the population of consumers as a
whole. In this perspective the probability Pi can be interpreted as the probability that
alternative xie L(c) will be chosen by a randomly chosen consumer of the population
W.
We have still not answered the question of how the i-th producer will set his
subjective probability distribution p due to the available information. But we noted in
theorem S33 that the only unbiased quantity that measures the uncertainty of an
arbitrary probability distribution p is the measure H(p). In our case where there are
several possible distributions P to choose among, the question is: Which distribution
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is using only the available information, Le. minimal information, and is at the same
time unbaised? The answer is obviously the probability distribution p* that maximizes
H(P) and at the same time satisfies all other conditions on p, i.e theorem S35. This is
so because H(p) is a measure of uncertainty. The higher the value of H(P) is, the
greater the uncertainty, and thus the less information is assumed into the distribution.
Therefore, the maximum value ofH(p) corresponds to the minimal infonnation
probability distribution, which is the distribution that uses only the specified
information, Le. the only information available to the producers.
S36 Theorem.
Let the price vector se S be rational. Then the probability distribution p(c) =
p[L(c) IQ]e 9tI-1 satisfies theorem S35 and at maximizes H(p) if and only if it
is of log-linear type, Le. if for some a, oe 9t
[E32] p[L(c) IQ] = exp{a - o·s}, ~O ¢::> Pi(c) = exp{a - o'cd, ~, 'Vi,
sec,
where c, is an element of se S, and a = -ln(L exp(-O'Si)}'
i
£rQQf: It is sufficient to show that [E32] is the unique solution to
[E33] {max - K L Pi In Pi subject to L Pi = 1,L CrPi S; cl,
p i i i
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and c, S Cj~ Pi ~ Pj' and where L CrPi S c follows from axiom S24. First
i
we solve [E33]. We state the Lagrangean function for [E33]:
L = - K L Pi In Pi - 1..1(1', Pi - 1) - "-2(1', CrPi - C). The fust 21-2 optimality
i i i
conditions of the problem are: ~ = K·ln Pi + 1 + Al + ~·Ci ~ O 1\ :~ Pi = O,
for all i=I ,... ,I-l. Assume Pi > Ofor all i=I, ... ,I-l. Then
:~ = K·ln Pi + 1 + Al + ~·Ci = O, for all i=I, ... ,I-l. If we solve for Pi we
get: Pi = exp(-~c/K)·exp«-I-Al)/K), for all i=I, ... ,I-l. Since L Pi = 1,
i
L Pi = exp«-I-Al)/K)1', exp(-~ci/K) = 1 <=>
i i
exp«-I-Al)/K) = [L exp(-~ci/K)rl. Thus we write:
i
Pi = exp(-"-2ci/KH1', exp(-~c/K)rl, for all i=L,...,I-I, which is equal to
l
[E32] if O = ~/K. Next we check that ci S Cj~ Pi ~ Pj for all i=I, ...,I-l.
. dpi(C) s: ~ -&:. -I -~c; ~ -&:. -1 -&:; s:Since O<PiSI, a;- = u'{~e J}'e '[(~e J}·e - 1] = u·Pr[Pi - 1]
l. .
J J
S O~ c, S Cj~ Pi ~ Pj' for all i,j=I, ... ,I-I, i*j. QED.
It is evident that all members 'of B will use [E32] as their chosen probability
distribution in assessing the choices of the members of W. This follows from axiom
S24 where it is specified that the information set is the same for all members of B, i.e.
Qi = Q for all i=I, ... ,I-I, and from theorem S36, which says that [E32] is a unique
representation of the probability distribution over L(c), given CECI\.
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Funhennore we recognize that the probability distribution depends upon all
prices set by all producers. Thus the probability that a consumer will choose
alternative i is a function of all prices in the economy as defined here. Observing this
we note that
since O S Pi S 1, and,
The general probability distribution has the properties that the probability that a
consumer will choose alternative xie L(c) decreases with increasing price, and
increases with the increase in price of any other alternative.
We note that the objective function H(P) in [E33] is an unbiased measure of the
general uncertainty in the industry B as to how the final outcome will be for every
member of the industry. That H(p) is a measure of uncertainty is obvious since the
measure decreases when the probability distribution is sharply peaked, and increases
when the probability distribution approaches the uniform distribution.
We observe that the probability of observing the choice of any brand i is
dependent upon the parameter o. Assuming K=l, if the expected price level for the
whole industry increases marginally, o is interpreted as the marginal increase in H(P),
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i.e. the industry uncertainty. Accordingly the uncertainty, i.e. p, will move towards
the uniform distribution as c increases. This is quite reasonable since the information
contained in c is of less value to the producers when it implies few restrictions on p
than when it implies a strong restriction. Since O~ c ~ 1, a value of c close to 1
implies a wider range of possible prices for every member of B than do a value of c
close to O.If c is close to 1, this implies that any Cj 'v'j can be between Oand 1. Ifc
is, say, 0.1 then any Cj will on the average have to lie between Oand 0.1.
Consequently the range of possible probability distributions is narrowed.
Hence we observe that the probability of observing the choice of a particular
brand j is the inverse exponential function over the marginal increase in industry
uncenainty as a consequence of a marginal increase in the expected price level S,
multiplied by the price ofbrandj Cj' as set by frrmj. Since S decreases as c increases,
this interpretation says that the lower the uncertainty is initially, the more sensitive the
demand is towards the price level of a particular brand Finally, the parameter Scan
be viewed to encompass both how the present price level of a particular brand will
influence the probability of observing the choice of that particular brand, and how the
historical market information will influence the present distribution. Hence the
parameter S absorbs some essential information.
In section 8.1 of chapter 8 an extension of the information set will be presented.
This extension comprises marketing effort, marketing surveys and quality. Hence
these bits of firm specific information are incorporated into problem [E33], and a
probability distribution based on this information is added to the information already
included in the information set It should be pointed out that the solution and the
equilibrium which is derived for the basic model, will also apply to this extended
model.
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6.3 A note on lo~t.
It is evident that the structures of [E32] and [E18] are quite similar.1f vi is
assumed to be equal to -O'Cifor every i=L,...,I-I, then these models are identical. The
crucial question is: Why should anyone using a logit model observe that Vi should be
equated with -O'Ci?And furthermore, as we will show in section 8.1, why should
anyone recognize without any axiomatic basis, that vi should be equal to a specific
function over a range of several variables? That this could be the case can not be
deduced from the assumptions underlying the logit model. Neither can the value of
the parameter O,and any other paramteres, be found if one should entertain the idea
that vi could be represented by a linear function over price and several other variables.
When O,in principle, can be derived in our model [E32], a corresponding parameter
for the logit model has to be determined using additional assumptions of consumer
behaviour of some kind. Furthermore, the logit model does not permit any
enlargement of the information set to include variables such as marketing effort,
quality, and so on. Hence, even though the models [E32] and [E18] are similar in
structure, nevertheless they are totally different both regarding the fundamental
notions, and their practical use. Consequently these models can hardly be compared
when it comes to economic interpretation.
6.4 Expected demand and income.
We stated above that the producer will use his assessment of the consumers
expected demand as an input in deciding how to behave. Thus we have to assume the
relevance of the concept of expectation.
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S37 Definition.
E(xi) == pexi'N
The expectation that a certain brand iwill be chosen by an arbitrary consumer is
equal to Pi' and the expected transacted quantity is the probability'of choice times the
number of consumers in population W, PeN.
The producer is not in a position to know which alternative a consumer of the
population W will choose, i.e. he does not know which xieD(c) for all xieX,
i=l, ... ,I-l will be chosen. Therefore, to the producer, the choices of the consumers
of W seem random, and x can then be said to be a random variable relative to the
producers. Since the expectation of a random variable is defined, the producers are
now in a position to assess the expected demand from the consumers of W.
Let the population of consumers W be of size N, We9tN. Let ~(i,c) denote the
choice of consumer ne W for a given vector of disposable income prices ce Cl" i.e.
that xi=D(c) for consumer neW. Let xO(i,c)denote the total population demand for
alternative i, and let xO(c)denote the /-1 vector with elements xO(i,c), i=I, ...,I-l.
S38 Definition.
The total demand from the population W for an alternative i from the set of
alternatives i=l, ... ,I-l, is given by,
[E36] xO(i,c) =L ~(i,c), 'Vi, xO(i,c)e xO(c).
n
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It now follows from definition S37 of expectations that the expected demand
vector for the population as a whole for alternative i, is given by,
[E37] E[xo(c)] = N'pfc) <=> E[xo(i,c)] = N-Pi(c), 'r:/x(i,c)e X,
E[xo(i,c)]e E[xo(c)],
where p(c) denotes the probability distribution of the choices for the consumers
of W for given prices ce CA_
[E37] says that the expected demand is equal to the total size of the population
times the probability that a consumer of W will choose that particular alternative.
We stated in the representation theorem S? that the distribution for the choice
probabilities p is represented by [E32], which implies that [E37] can be written,
[E38] E[xo(c)] = Nexp] Cl - o-s},
or
[E38a] E[xo(i,c)] = N'exp {Cl - o·ei}, 'r:/i=I, ,I-I, E[xo(i,c)]e E[xo(c)]_
We may now conclude that the producers in the differentiated market assess the
expected demand as stated in [E38].
The vector of expected producer incomes are calculated as follows,
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or
[E39a] EI[xO(i,c)] = E[xO(i,c)],cj, 'v'i=l, ... .I-I,
where EI[xO(c)] denotes the expected income vector for all the I -I producers in
the market, and EI[xo(i,c)] denotes the expected income for producer of alternative i.
6.5 Producer costs.
We will now introduce the concept of costs. We simply state that every producer
i=l, ... .I-l in the market supplying the population W, has a cost function. The I-l
vectors of costs are given by,
S39 Definition.
h ~I-l. th f fi d ~I-lxI-l. th di al .w ere leE .;1\ IS e vector o ixe costs, VE .;1\ IS e agon matnx
of variable costs, and XSE 9tI-1 is the production vector.
It should be noted that the producer costs K are indexed in the same way as
prices, i.e. K is the income deflated producer costs.
For each producer we may state,
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[E40a] K, = ~ + vrxi, 'v'i=l, ... .l-L,
where xi denotes the quantity produced by producer i.
S40 Axiom.
For a given ce CA, XS = E[xo(c)].
Axiom 540 implies that xi = E[xo(i,c)] for all i= l ,...,I-l. This assumption is
stated for the sake of convenience. Assuming instant production and thereby we avoid
introducing the problem of inventory. We write [E40] as follows,
[E41] K(c) = {le +v·E[xo(c)] l,
or
[E41a] ~(c) = lei + vrE[xo(i,c)], 'v'i=l, ... ,I-l,
which gives the expected costs.
The introduced cost structure is quite simple. This is done to avoid complicating
the main issue. Introducing a more complex cost structure, accounting for such
problems as capacity etc., would make the model more realistic. However, such an
extension is left for further research.
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6.6 Profit maximization.
We will now turn to the behaviour of population B, initially defining and state
their strategy space. Through an interpretation of this strategy space and the
implications of these interpretations, and from our assumptions about the behaviour
of the members of population B, a complete description of producer behaviour is
provided.
S41 Axiom.
The members of population B can only make a choice from the strategy space
The strategy space of the members of the producer population B is denoted
Se 9tI-l, which coincides with the price space corresponding to 'PcX. Initially the
strategy space is made up by the Cartesian product of the sets dA for all i= 1,... ,1-1,
the set of possible prices for the members of B, i.e. S = ClAX" 'XC-lA. As it is
possible that the strategy sets of each member of B may differ from the same
members' sets ofpossible prices, we write
where SjcdAdenotes the strategy set of the i-th producer.
The strategy space is a vector space where sg = [~, ... ,sf, ,SI~l] is a strategy
vector and sf is the strategy selected by the i-th producer, g=I, ,G, each producer
choosing from G possible strategies.
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Note that CI\ = SxclA• Thus the elements of CA could have been the arguments
of the profit function, but since the elements of cl are influenced neither by the
members of population W nor the members of population B, these elements are
dropped as any part of the arguments of both the income and the cost functions.
It does follow that every strategy vector implies a set of elements denoted
1t(sg)e9tI-1, where the elements are 1-1 vectors of values called producer profit. Let
I(s)e 9tI-1 denote the vector of deterministic incomes for a given strategy or price
vector s.
S42 Definition.
1t(sg) = I(sg) - K(sg).
The profit space is now denoted 1t(S) and has as elements every element which
is a member of a profit set 1t(sg) implied by a strategy vector sg for all g=l, ... ,G.
It follows from definition S42 that the profit vectors of the set 1t(sg)are derived
from the respective income functions and cost functions which both contain an
element of assessment of consumer behaviour. This also forms the connection
between population B and population W. If this assessment of consumer behaviour is
the same for all members of the population B, then there is only one element of every
1t(sg)at(S), i.e. every 1t(sg) becomes a profit vector.
A particular strategy selected by a member of the population B may have several
implications, but only the profit implication is interesting to a member of B. This
follows from the fact that both population B and population W are populations of
individuals or associations of individuals. In chapter 2 we described the behaviour of
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the members of population W. This is a general description of human economic
behaviour in a given context. Thus it also applies to the behaviour of the members of
population B if the context allows it We wish to describe how the members of B
make their choices among the possible elements of their strategy set. Consequently
we recognize that the only economic implication of a chosen strategy is the resulting
profit, since this profit is in fact an income to this member. We take it that a member
of B is a member of at least one consumer population similar to W:
S43 Axiom.
Every member of B is also a member of at least one population in the same
class of populations represented by W.
Axiom S43 implies that an increase in income will result in an increase in the
consumption of the general commodity, and by the axiom of monotonicity , and yield
increased utility. Thus higher income is preferred over lower, which implies that
higher profit is preferred over lower profit Since the only economic implication of a
strategy for a member of B is the amount of profit he receives, he will choose that
strategy which maximizes his profit. Let S_i*denote the vector of strategies for the 1-2
other members of B than the i-th.
S44 Theorem.
Every producer i=l, ...,I-l of B, sets the price such that max 1ti(Si,s_i*)'
Sie Si
Proof: The only economic implication of the strategy space S is the profit
space 1t(S). From axiom S43 it follows that every member of B is a consumer
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in the other capacity . The profit then becomes income. It is evident that a
larger income provides the basis for a larger consumption. Axiom S12 of
monotonicity states that larger consumption is preferred to lower
consumption. Consequently higher profit is preferred to lower profit, and
every member of B will maximize his profit so he can consume more in his
other capacity as a member of a consumer population. QED.
From definition S37 of expectations, it follows that expected profit can be
written,
[E43] E[1t(s)] = El[xo(s)] - K(s),
or
[E43a] E[1ti(S)] = (Si - vj)-E[xo(i,s)] - Ki' 'V i = 1,... ,1-1.
S45 Axiom.
Every member of B, i= l ,...,I-l, E[1tj(s)]R(E)1tj(s).
Axiom S45 states that every producer in the market is risk neutral, i.e. that the
producers are indifferent between receiving the profit itself or the expectation of the
profit.
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S46 Theorem.
Every member of B, i=I, ... .l-I, sets his price such that, max E[7ti(Si,S_i*)]'
SieSi
Proof: E[7ti(s)]R(E)7ti(S) for all producers, i=l, .I-I,
=> {max E[7ti(s)]}R(E){max 7ti(s)}for all i=l, ,I-l. QED.
s;.eSi sieSi
The producer behaviour is now completely described. We next turn to the
discussion of market equilibrium.
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Chapter 7. Price equilibrium.
We will now analyse market equilibrium in a differentiated market as defined
above. We assume that the different producers, i=l, ... ,I-l, compete between
themselves in serving the consumers. Consequently the situationshould be described
as a game where the producers are the players.
7.1 The ~ame.
There are three ways to characterize a game: The normal form, the characteristic
function form and the extensive form. The normal form corresponds to describing the
game through strategies, and we consequently choose this form.
There are four parts to the definition of games in normal form: Players,
strategies, payoff or profit functions, and additional rules. The first three parts may be
symbolized by (B,S,7t), where B={ 1,...,I-l} is the set of players, S is the strategy
space of the game and 7tis the vector of payoff. We denote the strategy set of the i-th
player by Si' and its elements are any possible CitA price value that is an element of
the strategy set of the i-th player is denoted Si'A strategy vector is written s = [si,s_a
where s., is the vector of strategies of the 1-2 players other than the i-th. The payoff or
profit function of the i-th player is denoted, as above, 7ti(S),which is equal to 7ti(c) as
long as CES. It follows from our elaboration above that 7ti(s)can be substituted by
the expected profit function E1ti(S).The profit function is, as noted above, scalar
valued. Corresponding to the notation for the strategy sets, a profit vector is written
7t(s) = [7t1(s),tt.,7tI_I(s)] = [7ti(S),7t_i(s)].
Inour model the only additional rule we take in to account says that no binding
agreements can be made between the players. Thus our game is non-cooperative.
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7.2 An eguilibrium concept
To establish an equilibrium we need a conceptual definition. The non-
cooperative equilibrium is characterized by two conditions, see among others
Friedman (1977). The first states that the equilibrium strategies, denoted by s·=
[s~,... ,S;_l]T, are actually in the strategy sets of the players. The secondcondition is
that no players could increase his own profit by deviating from his equilibrium
strategy, given that the other players use their equilibrium strategies. Formally,
S47 Definition.
A· ilib .. • [. • ]T S h thpnce equi num ISa vector s = sl, ... ,sl_1 E suc at
•• ·w S ll lE7ti(si ,s_i) ~ E7ti(Si,s_i)' v siE i and a 11=1, ... ,1-1.
A price equilibrium is a vector s·= [s~,... ,S;_I]T such that each producer
• •i=L,....I-I, maximizes his profit with respect to si at si conditional upon prices s_i
chosen by the other producers. This price equilibrium is called the Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies.
7.3 The existence of a unigue price eguilibrium.
We now turn to the question ifthere exists a unique price equilibrium. The
original theorem of the existence of non-cooperative equilibrium was proved by Nash
(1951). Here we will build on the contraction mapping theorem first stated by
Banach (1922), and we shall show that there exists a unique price equilibrium in pure
strategies for the designed game.
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Let us first define the best reply function of the i-th player.
848 Definition.
The best reply function of producer i is
Ri(s) = argmax E7ti(si,S_i), i=l, ... ,I-l.
The best reply function is the strategy the i-th player will choose given all the
other players' choices. The strategic variable in our model is price, that is the price the
i-th player will choose faced with the choices of all the other 1-2 players. Thus Ri(s_i)
is a function valued over s_i.
Due to defmition S48 the best reply function for the i-th player can be specified
as follows:
dEn; .
[E44] T. = O~ ci = Ri(s_i)' for all i = 1, ... , I-l.
l
We calculate:
dEn; 2 .
[E45] - = p. - 8(1tiP' - 7tiP') = O where 1t.= c. - v. p' = p·(c .) = p·(s·) 'VIdei l l l' l l l' l l -l l -1' •
The expected profit to the i-th player if an arbitrary consumer chooses his brand
is E(1ti) = 1tiPi'since the i-th producer makes a profit only if the brand produced by the i-
th player is chosen by the consumer.
The same producer will experience the following variance in his individual
profit:
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[E46] Var(1ti) = E[(1ti - E1ti)2] = Pi(1ti- 1tiPi)2+ (l-Pi)·(O - 1tiPi)2
2 2 2
= 1tiPi - 1tiPi·
If [E4S] is multiplied by 1tion both sides we get:
[E47] 1tiPi- O(1tfPi-1tfpf) = O<=>E1ti - oVar(1ti) = O, for all i = 1,... ,1-1.
Hence in equilibrium
E:n:1 ~ E:n:1-l
[E48] 0= -Y-ar(-n-l) = ... = -Yar(-1ti-·) = ... = ~Yar(---:-=-=nl_'-:-l)·
[E48] says that the marginal increase in the function H(p), o, as a consequence
of a marginal increase in the expected price level for the whole industry, C, shall at the
equilibrium be equal to expected profit relative to the variance of the profit We
observe that this implies that if the price level is expected to rise from one period to
the next o will be reduced - implying among other things that a rise in prices will
affect demand less then earlier. However, from [E48] such a decrease in o also
implies that the relative figure y:) will decrease for all i.The economic
interpretation of this is that uncertainty increases, i.e. the variance shows a relative
increase. This is so because the effect of known quantities on choice probabilities
such as prices decreases in importance relative to unknown quantities. Hence the
probability distribution over L(c) will be wider, Le. the probability of observing a
high priced brand being chosen has increased relative to the probability of observing
the choice of a low priced brand. Since price is assumed to be the essential
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information determining the probability distribution, such a development implies
greater uncertainty with regard to the outcome based on the available infonnation.
From [E45] the best reply function can be deduced:
[E49] ~(c_i) = Vi+ a-l(1-pJl ¢:) ~(c_i) = Vi+ a-l + a-l.e-~Rt·[L e-OOjrl,
J~i
for all i = 1,... ,1-1.
Equation [E49] is a functional equation which has no explicit solution for ~(c_j).
Hence we can only obtain an approximation of the best reply function. It is reasonable
to approximate [E49] at the point Cj= cV'j= 1,...,1-1, since it is assumed that
L CfPj S; c. Thus it is reasonable to expect that Cj,j=I, ... ,I-I, will fluctuate around
j
C. Consequently c is a more reasonable evaluation point than for example Cj= O
V'j=I, ... ,I-l.
From [E49] we deduce that if Cj= R, = c =>
h w··· - s::-l s::-l -~Ri(~ -&:j)-lwere V = Vi = Vj v lJ, since C= Vi+ u + u e £. e =>
j~i
c = Vi+ a-I + a-1e-oc(L e-OCrl.But since c, a, and (1-2) is equal to all players,
j
W· • if - h - s::-l s::-l -oc( oc(1 2)-1) Th & -V= Vi= Vj v I,J l C= C, ence c = V+ u + u e e - . US lor C= Cwe set
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v=O.
Since C is a known quantity, we solve [ESO]for the unknown parameter S in the
point c =e:
[ES1] S= 1+ (l-2r1 •
c
We note that S can be estimated as a function over the range of competitors
represented by the number 1-2, and the historical information represented by the
expected price level for the industry as a whole, e. Furthermore, we observe that S
will approach ~ when (1-2) approaches any large number. Consequently Swill
c
decrease with increasing number of competitors and increasing industry price level.
Intuitively this seems reasonable. We recall that ife is increased marginally, Sis
interpreted as the marginal increase in the objective function [E33], i.e. in the industry
uncertainty. Hence it is reasonable to assume that S will decrease as the uncertainty
increases. Obviously the uncertainty will increase with increasing numbers of
competitors, since the market power of each player is expected to decrease with
increasing numbers. As stated above an increase in the maximum acceptable industry
price level e will slacken the restrictions on the range of individual prices, and hence
the probability distribution p. Accordingly the uncertainty increases. It is, therefore,
reasonable to observe that the marginal increase in the uncertainty is positive, and
decreases with increasing e. Consequently it is plausible that S ---+ ~ for increasing
c
number of competitors.
In c = e the first and second partial derivatives are:
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[E52] aRi - -(1+ (I-2
r1)(1_2)-1(1 (1_2)-1)-1- f & all' '-1 l-l"ac. - e + - l' lor lJ- ..... , I*J.
J
[E54] !~= _2_ = 13, for all ij,k=1, ... ,1-1, j*i,k, k*i.
J It (I-2)3.c
Assuming that the variable cost is positive, the approximation of equation [E49]
in c = c is:
55 ( -{ 1 ( (I 2)-1 -(1+(1-2)"1)(I 2)-1 )-1 l)[E ] R, C_i)=Vi + c-l + -)e + - [(1-2 - "2]
+ fiL Cj + ~hL(cf-Ccj) + ~hL L (CjCk- e(Cj+Ck) + i),
j~i j~i j~i,k bi,j
assuming that terms of higher order are equal to zero
We observe that [E55] is only dependent upon known quantities, that it will
increase with C, Vi' and Cj for all j=i, j=L, ...,1-1, and decrease with increasing number
of competitors, 1-2.
The approximation [E55] of the reply function is presented only in order to
research some of the properties of this important relationship further. However, when
it comes to our objective of establishing a unique price equilibrium for the game in
question, we will have to use equation [E49] directly. We now turn to this problem of
establishing a unique price equilibrium.
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Let us first define the tenn contraction mapping:
S49 Definition.
The mapping R(c) is a contraction if and only if there exists a number
O< k <1 such that
We now recall a useful property of metric spaces:
S50 Lemma.
R: S4S is a continuous contraction mapping that associates a point R(s) of S
with a point s of S, where S is a complete metric space. Then there exists a
•• •unique fixed point s : s = R(s ).25
frQQf;. Existence: Choose an arbitrary point c in C. We have:
d(Rn(c), Rn+1(c» S; k·d(Rn-1(c), R\c» ¢:> d(Rn(c), Rn+1(c» S; kn·d(c, R(c»
If n-eee, then d(Rn(c), Rn+1(c»40, since k"40. Thus there exists a fixed
point for Rn(c) = Rn+1(c), n4oo. Uniqueness: Assume the existence of two
fixed points, z and w, for the contraction mapping R. Since R is a contraction
d(R(z), Rtw) S; k·d(z,w). But, since z and w are fixed points, the following
is true: d(z,w) = d(R(z), R(w», since R(z) = z, R(w) = w. It follows that the
contraction d(R(z), Rrw) S; k·d(z,w) => d(z,w) =O=> z = w. Thus any fixed
25 Definition: A fixed point is a point that is mapped onto itself by a given transformation.
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point of a contraction is unique. QED.
This lemma was fust stated by Banach (1922) and is called the contraction
mapping fixed point theorem. We now state:
S51 Theorem.
The game (B,S,1t), where the best reply function for the i-th player is
represented by [E49], has a unique fixed point.
ftQQf: We will show that the best reply function [E49] is a contraction
mapping for all i = 1,... ,1-1. Lemma S50 says that if the following two
conditions are satisfied then the game has a unique equilibrium point:
1. R, is a contraction mapping for all i = 1,... ,1-1.
2. The strategy space is a complete metric space.
We start by proving that R; is a contraction mapping. Since the best reply
function is an unknown function specified by a functional equation, we have
to research the properties of Ri' It is known that if :i< 1 for all k= 1,... ,1-1,
k:;ei, then Ri is a contraction mapping over the strategy space S.
R; is a contraction if·=: < 1, for all i, k:;ei.Thus we check:
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aRi PiPk 1 (1) 1 & all i k .
:l.... = 2 < <=> Pi +Pk < , lor 1,;;t:}.
""k [l-p] +[l-Pi]Pi
We know that Pk for all kel, ...,I-I, k~i, cannot be greater than I-Pi. This
implies that if Pi(l +Pk) < 1 is true for Pk = l-Pi' then Pi(l+Pk) < 1 holds for
every OS Pk S l-Pi' for all k=I, ...,I-I, k~i. Ifwe set Pk = l-Pi we get:
Thus, if O< Pi < 1 for all i=I, ... ,I-I, then ~Ri = [~ < 1 for all i.k,
C1ck l-p] +[l-Pi]Pi
k~. Since Pi = exp(-Oci)·(Lexp(-Ocj)rl and OS ci Sl for all i=I, ... ,I-I,
j
then O<Pi < 1 will always be true. Thus R, is a contraction mapping for all
i=L,...,I-l.
The second condition is that the strategy space S constitutes a complete metric
space. No player will set his price lower than the normalized cost, and no
higher than the level of the normalized income of the producers. Therefore, Vk
S CkS 1, for all k, and thus the strategy set Sk = [Vk,l] for all k = 1,...,1-1,
which is a compact and convex set of 9t+. Thus the strategy space S is a
complete metric space since every compact space is a complete space. QED.
Inproving theorem S51 we have established that the subjective probability
distribution of every member of B is represented by [E32]. We may therefore
conclude that all members of B will assess the demand from the population of
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consumers W using the indicated probability distribution as stated by [E37]. Thus the
demand equation that the member of B faces is stochastic, which it always will be
since it represents a forecast on the hand of the producer.
The equilibrium established in theorem SSl is the expected price equilibrium and
is as such used by the producers in setting their offer to the market The subsequent
market equilibrium will be a consequence of the expected market equilibrium and the
unknown demand from the members of W.
. . * * s*The offer presented by member, of B can be summarized by ci = ~(c_i) and ~
•= N·Pi(c ). The number of individual members of population W who would want to
*choose alternative i, for a given price vector c , i.e. number of consumers for who
* i. *D(c ) = x , IS denoted by ni(c ).
SS2 Axiom.
s* *If Xi < nj(c ) for any i=l ,... .I-I, then those members ofW who do not
receive their choice will not choose any other alternative from 'P.
Axiom SS2 states that any surplus demand for a particular alternative is not
allocated to any other alternative. This assumption is stated to avoid complicating the
analysis with reallocation of surplus demand
It follows that since the price level is assumed to be fixed by the producers at
each incremental moment, the quantity transacted at each moment will be
min [xf,nj(c *)]. Denote the transacted quantity in equilibrium for alternative xi by X;.
We state:
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S53 Theorem.
c· and x~=min [xr,ni(c·)] represent the unique market equilibrium for the
market defmed by W and B.
Proof: Due to theorem S51 c· => c~ for all r=I, ...,I-1. Due to axiom S40 ~ =
• s· • •N·Pi for all i=I, ... ,I-1. c => Xi =N·Pi(c ) "fij(c ). In virtue ofaxiom S52
Theorem S53 concludes our analysis by stating the existence of a unique market
equilibrium. This equilibrium is achieved by recognizing that the producers initially
have to analyze their own situation, and then market a fixed offer. These two
assumptions are the basic practical assumptions of the presented theory.
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Chapter 8. Extensions and reflections.
8.1 An extened model.
The model presented in this treatise on producer assessment of demand, is based
on the information included in Q, i.e. some historical data, and the general principles
of economic behaviour. We will in the subsequent analysis discuss how the
information set should be enlarged and how such an extension affects the results of
the basic model presented above.
Market research is quite often used by firms when an assessment of future
demand is done. One naturally ask how such information should be used in the
presented model. This maket information could be comprised in the model by
imposing restrictions on the probability distribution,p, Le. I-l additional restrictions
are included in the problem denoted [E33]. Assume that aj, for all j=l ,... ,I-l, is the
fraction of the respondents in a market survey which said they would choose brandj.
One could then impose the restriction Pj ~ aj - ct <=) ~~~Pj~ aj, for all j=l ,... ,I-l, 1-
2 >O.This restriction says that the probability of observing that brand j is chosen
should be greater than the observed fraction adjusted for some expression which
indicates that the probability Pj should approach the fraction aj when the number of
alternatives open to the consumers increases. A tentative suggestion of such an
expression is ct. Such a model would comprise both the uncertainty in the situation
and the available information, and at the same time be unbiased towards the
information used.
Eventually the model could be given an economic interpretation. Denote the
marginal change in the objective function in [E33] of an increase in aj by Jlj,
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j=l ,...,I-l. Then Jlj can be interpreted as an expression of the marginal reduction in
the total industry uncertainty, and hence also the uncertainty to the producer of brand
j, if aj is increased.
The information gained from a market survey could also encompassed in the
restriction LCfPj = c in [E33], where c could be constructed su~hL Cj,t_l·aj'
j j
An other category of information which should be considered relevant is
represented by macroeconomic quantities such as expected economic growth. It is in
most cases likely that any expected general economic growth will reduce the effect of
high or low prices on the choice probability, since increased income will make the
consumers less price conscious. Denote the expected growth rate in the economy for
the present period by g. If g is incorporated in the expected price level C, so that the
expected price level is somewhat increased as a function of g, then ()will decrease and
the effect of the level of any brand' s price on demand will be less. Since it is plausible
that prices in general will rise as a consequence of positive economic growth, such a
incorporation of g into c is quite tenable. Hence c in the problem [E33] can be
modified so that: c = F(g)' L dj,t-l'Cj,t-l' where F(g) is a function over g.
j
It is generally accepted that increased quality, everything else being equal, will
increase a brand's chances of being chosen. The problem is of course to measure
quality in any objective way. Firstly, quality can be distinguished into two different
categories: Horizontal and vertical quality. Horizontal quality deals with such features
as colour, style, design, texture, flavour, and so on. Vertical quality is higher
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standard, superior, inferior, octane content in petrol, numbers of doors in a car, hours
of light of an electric bulb, and so on. Any objective measure of horizontal quality can
hardly be defined. However, one should be able to measure vertical quality. Denote
% V'j as some public and official normalized measure of the vertical quality of brand j
in industry B. We would expect the probability thatj is chosen to-increase with qj'
everything else constant Hence if vertical quality is included in the information set,
then ~ ~ O V'j. The question is how quality is to be introduced into our assessment
problem. Obviously the quality index will have to be included in some constraint in
the problem [E33] of theorem S36. The question is how this is to be done to be in
accordance with reasonable economic behaviour with regard both to consumers and
producers. A suggestion is that the following constraint is added to the problem of
[E33]: LPrqj;::: q, where q is the industry minimum average quality level, which is
j
either known to all producers, or assumed to be a sort of consensus level which the
industry as a whole does not want to fall below. In the car industry for the segment of
small cars, the quality index can be measuring the number of doors and the level of
extra equipment such as radio, heating, ventilation, security systems and so on. The
minimum average level can be some level that most producers will be above, and only
the rather low quality cars will be below. Consequently q can be set to be equal to the
critical value which classifies a brand as low quality if below, and as a brand of
medium and higher quality if above.
Most economists believe that active marketing influence demand and
preferences. Some argue that increased marketing efforts increase demand. In our
context that implies that increased marketing effort increases the probability of choice.
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How tenable this theory is can be questioned. However, it has some theoretical and
empirical merit. Let bj denote the marketing effort of finnj,j=l, ...,I-l, e.g. a
quantity measuring the resources used on advertising during the previous period.
How bj, \tj, is to be comprised in our model has to be researched further. However,
a suggestion is forwarded: Recognizing that bj in general should effect Pj' so that an
increase in the effort bj should increase Pj at a decreasing rate, i.e. ~ ~ 0, ~:'jS 0,
J J
an additional constraint in problem [E33] can be formed: L Prbj ~ D, where D is
j
some agreed averaged minimum level of marketing effort for the industry as a whole.
Henee Dshould be interpreted as a kind of critical value for a company's marketing
effort. If the effort is below this value, then the company could be regarded to be
without brand profile. The company does not seek to distinguish itself from the other
producers in the industry. This value I) could therefore be set through a surveyor
analysis of which level of marketing effort is regarded as the critical value
distinguishing non-profile and profiled companies. Such a constraint says that the
probability distribution p should be such that at least Don the average is observed for
the industry as a whole. Consequently, everything else equal, we should be more
likely to observe the choice of brand j than brand i if bj > bi' This is in accordance
with the theory saying that the greater the marketing effort the higher the demand or
the probability of choice.
To account for the suggestions above with regard to an extended information set,
the information problem [E33] can be remodelled:
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[E56]
subjectto
The Lagrangean function is:
L = -LPfin Pj - A,l(LPj - 1) - ~(LPrCj - c) + A,3(LPrQj - q)
j j j j
+ A,4(~p·"b· - D) + 1-2~Jl-(p. - e·)
~ J J 1-3~ J J J'
j j
where 1..1, ~, ~, 1..4, and Jlj 'Vj, are the Lagrangean multipliers"
The 21-2 optimality conditions are:
~ W ~
0Pi = In Pi + 1 + 1..1 + A,2"Ci- A,3"Qi- A,4"bi- 1-3Jli ~ O" 0PiPi = O, for all
i=I,""",I-l. Assume that Pi > O 'Vi, then
In p. + 1 + 1..1+ A,2"C·- A,3"q·- A,4"b·- 1-2Jl. = O ~1 1 1 1 1-3 1
-t..l-l-"-2"Cj+A.:3"CJj+i...t.bi+ll J.I.i -t.. -1 ~ -"-2-c:+A.:3"q·+~·b:+ 1-211. -1Pi = e 1-3 , where e l = [~e J ~ J 1-3 J] "Hence:
j
[E57] Pi = e-~+PCJj+'Yl>i+ ::~ J.I.i[L e-&_;+pqj+'Yl>j+ ;:~ I1jr\
j
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In equation [E57] a has the same interpretation as earlier. The parameter p is
interpreted as the marginal decrease in industry uncertainty, i.e. the narrowing of the
probability distribution p as a consequence of a marginal increase-in the minimum
average quality level. That the industry uncertainty should decrease when the
minimum acceptable quality level is increased is reasonable, since we would expect
such an increase to induce consumers to turn from the low quality brands towards
brands of higher quality. Hence the probability that the consumer will choose any
high quality brand increases, and subsequently the industry uncertainty is reduced
since stronger restrictions are introduced Furthermore, p will increase at a decreasing
rate with increasing q, and hence the higher the minimum level is set, the more
probable it will be to observe the consumers choosing a high-quality brand. If one
assume that q is set by a survey in the market as to quality attributes, one will
typically observe that qwill be low in areas where the standard of living is low, and
high in developed areas.
y is interpreted as the marginal decrease in industry uncertainty if the average
minimum marketing level is increased marginally. Obviously ~:~ = -Y'Pi[Pi-1] ~ O,
2 1
and : p~= -21p~ SO. This is tenable iff> is interpreted as the criticallevel of
ab;
marketing which a company has to be above to gain attention from consumers, since
an increase in the minimum level will weaken the market power of the low spending
fimrs, to the benefit of the high spendig firms, Hence, if the marketing effort
constraint is to be respected the demand for the brands of the stronger marketing
companies have to increase at the cost of the firms which are weaker as to marketing.
~ 'Vi is interpreted as the marginal decrease in industry uncertainty as a
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consequence of an increase in the market share, measured for the i-th finn in a recent
market survey conducted for the whole industry. We note that :: = ~:~Pi(1-Pi)> O,
which says that the marginal influence of brand i on the industry uncertainty will be
at its greatest when the probability of observing brand i is equal to 0.5. This is
reasonable since in that ease it will be as likely to observe the choice of i as that of all
other brands taken together, and a marginal change in for example ei' will therefore
have a strong effect.
Based on the expression [ES7] of the choice probability we may now deduce the
best reply function for fum i for an extended information set:
Equation [ES8] is the general reply function, assuming that the producers use a
particular range of information, and that the variables qj and bj are fixed and cannot be
altered by the players, i.e. price is the only strategic variable of the producers.
Some further research has to be directed towards an extension of the model to
several strategic variables, e.g. % and bj in addition to Cj.In this case the best reply
function will be the solution to the following differential equation:
dE~ dE~ dE~dEn- = -·de- + -·dq- + -·db- ~
l dei l dct l dbi l
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We observe that the best reply with regard to price, ci*' quality, ~*, and
marketing effort, bi*, will be found when solving equation [E59], and subsequently
all these variables depend on each other. Since it should be of considerable interest to
derive an expression and a model which allows more than one strategic variable to
influence firm behaviour, the implications of equation [E59] should be a subject of
further research.
Returning to equation [E58] we recognize that theorem S51 applies to this
extended behavioural equation as well as to the basic relationship of equation [E49].
Hence all the fundamental points made in relation to the basic model represented by
equations [E32] and [E49], are valid for the extended model represented by equations
[E57] and [E58], if price is kept as the only strategic variable. Subsequently theorem
S53 also applies to the extended problem, and an equilibrium is assured.
Consequently we can conclude that a theory comprising how producers in
differentiated markets should deal with uncertainty and a wide range of information,
but not complete information, is forwarded in this tteatise.
Included in this theory is a detailed analysis which explicitly points out how
demand functions are to be constructed, and which interpretations the parameters of
such models should be subjected to in differentiated markets. That is, any demand
function should be on the log-linear form. One should thus not be surprised to
observe that in quite a few econometric analyses the log-linear specification is the
most appropriate. Observing this econometric implication, we turn in section 8.3 to a
discussion of some of the econometric implications of the theory.
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8.2 A note on competition.
Competition as such has not been the main subject of this treatise. However, it is
obvious that the model forwarded should eventually be used to analyse the
competition between firms in the relevant context Specifically, the presented model
should enjoy some significance in analysing the extent of differentiation in an industry
with respect to such variables as quality, marketing effort, ete.
The Lerner index Li is defined as the margin between equilibrium price and
marginal cost of firm i.
[E6O] Li = Ri~.Vi = [1 +Vi'~).(1-Pi)rl 'Vi.
1
The Lerner index measures the degree of market power of finn i compared to all
other firms in the industry. The finn having the highest index value has the highest
profit per unit produced and has the most market power.
Relation [E6O] shows that in our context and in a Nash price equilibrium, market
power increases with market share, i.e. Pi' and it decreases with higher marginal cost,
vi' From relation [E57] it is known that the market share Pi increases with an increase
in quality, and an increase in marketing effort, and that it decreases with increasing
price. The effect of these quantities upon Pi depends on the parameters, p, y, and ~,
which depends upon industry measures of criticallevels. Hence the measure of
industry uncertainty H(p) should be recognized as a measure of differentiation within
the industry, and subsequently as a measure of competition in the industry. At this
point we observe that Shannons (1948) measure H(P) has been proposed as a
measure of concentration, i.e. competition, by several authors, e.g. Theil (1967),
Horowitz & Horowitz (1968). See also Jacquemin (1987). However, these proposals
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have been rather ad hoe. The proposals have been forwarded not based on any
axiomatic analysis but out of a need to measure concentration within a industry. Thus
the precise measure of industry concentration should be the aggregation of the
individual Lerner indexes, weighted by market share Pi:
~ ~ Pi
[E61] L = ~ PrL; = ~ l + vi&(l-Pi)'
i i
The difference between H(P) and L is not crucial, but in principle H(p) measures
the industry uncertainty and the level of differentiation when Lmeasures the level of
concentration within the industry. Hence in practice there are no difference.
Returning to [E60] we observe that the market power of firm i is increased when
the quality of the firm 's brand is increased, and when the marketing effort of the firm
increases. This is in accordance with what one would expect if these variables are
given significance as information. Hence the producer assessment model presented
could be used, in principle, to analyse complex situations where competition relies not
only on price and capacity but also on a diverse range of other variables. How the
presented model should be used in an analysis involving a more complex production
structure, is left to further research.
8.3 A note on econometrics.
Most models of discrete choice problems are specified as econometric models.
This is the case with Borsch-Supan (1987), and McFadden (1978), to mention a few.
Most analysts state, as do Borsch-Supan (1987), that such artificial assumptions
as random utility are necessary to derive an econometric model. They recognize that
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the assumption is questionable, but, nevertheless make the assumption out of
convenience. The model set forth in this treatise is not an econometric model as such.
It belongs to the domain of economic theory. However, every economic theory has
econometric implications, as does this particular theory. We shall not meticulously
discuss all relevant problems which arise when an econometric specification based. on
our model is made. Instead we shall bring up some ideas for further research on these
topics.
Quite often an econometric analysis is concerned with the specification and
estimation of a demand function. In short this is the problem of identifying the
empirical demand relation based on empirical observations that represents equilibrium
situations between the demand and the supply relations. One problem which has to be
considered in such a specification, is the problem of autocorrelation.
The autocorrelation problem for an econometric specification derived from the
theory set forth in this treatise, illustrates at the same time that an econometric
specification cannot be made in isolation from the underlying economic model.
Assume that the members of B have offered to the market their products four different
times. Then the economic agents have gained some experience which is included. as
historical data in the producer information set Q. Each time the producers have
assessed demand and offered their quantities and prices represented by ~* = N 'Pi(C*)
and c; for every i=I ,....I-L The consumers have responded by demanding ni(c\
*Since the price level c is decided upon and fixed before the actual demand is known
to the producers, the observed quantity is x:,t = min [~~t>ni,t(c"n for every i=I, ... .l-I
. * * s* * s* *
of B. Assume that for producer l, Xi,t= ni,t, Xi,t+l = Xi,t+l' xi,t+2 = xi,t+2' and xi,t+3=
ni,t+3'We note that the actual demand from population W is observed for t and t+3.
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However, for t+ 1 and t+2 the expected demand constitute the observations. The
figure below illustrates the situation. The thin line indicates the expected demand as it
is assessed by the producers. The thick line indicates actual demand. The points that
will be observed are indicated by the notation t to t+3.
Price, c
n,t Expected demand
Actual demand-
Quantity
Figure: Expected and actual demand.
It is obvious that the transactions observed for a given price of brand i do not
necessarily coincide with the actual demand. This is due to axiom S52, and an
underlying assumption implying that all producers present their offers in the market
simultaneously. The latter assumption, which is not unreasonable in a pure theoretical
context, may be deemed invalid in an econometric context since producers usually
interact continuously with the market. However, the real econometric problem of a
specification based on our theory is due to the fact that the expected relationship used
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by the producer to set his offer in the market is based on historical data. As such the
offer denoted by xt+l in the figure above is derived using the information gained in
•period t,Le. the information set Qt+l contains the information ct and nt. Hence the
observation at t+ 1 is not independent of the previous observation at t.Neither of the
values of the variables x·, e: n, and c• is independent of the previous values. Recall
that the actual transacted quantity for brand i at time t in principle can be expressed
• • s·[E62] Xi,t+l= f (xi,t+l' ni,t+l)'
The price of the i-th brand is
which is equal to the best reply function to the i-th player, where QOis the
. formati ti • •• 5··m ormanon set excluded or ci,t' C-i,t' c-i,t+l' ~,t' Xi,t.
The actual demand is expressed
The quantity offered in the market, i.e. the supply, is expressed
s· s··[E64] Xi,t+l= f (Ci,t+l)'
•It is obvious from equations [E49] and [£62] to [E64], that Xi,t+lis dependent
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• • . •. s· .upon Xi,t' Ci,t+l1Sdependent upon Ci,t,ni,t+l 1Sdependent upon ni,t, and Xi,t+l1S
dependent upon :,(r Hence in principle autocorrelation will be present in any attempt
to estimate these relationships. When autocorrelation is observed in an econometric
model this is not necessarily due to any mis-specification. On the contrary
autocorrelation is a phenomenon which quite often should be observed since
economic behaviour is autocorrelated. Consequently econometric models which
includes autocorrelation should not necessarily be rejected. Instead one should seek
the answer to this econometric problem in the underlying economic model, and solve
the problem based on an explicit recognition of autocorrelation as an economic
phenomenon and not only as an econometric problem.
Therefore, when econometric models are specified based on the assumption that
the observations that are observed are formed in the equilibrium between actual
demand and supply, without accounting for the assessment process which is
described in this treatise, it seems natural to assume that the model's residuals are
non-correlated. It should not come as a surprise that autocorrelation is observed when
the model is fitthe ted to data. When this is the case most analysts reject their
specification, but keep their underlying economic model. As illustrated above, it is not
necessarily the specification which should be rejected. It is surely the underlying
economic model, i.e. the assumption that the actual observations are not themselves
determinants of economic behaviour and later observations, which should be rejected.
The problem of autocorrelation is derived directly from an economic phenomenon. A
phenomenon which should not be assumed away. It should be given an important
position in any economic models leading to econometric specifications of
relationships in differentiated markets.
Consequently most econometric specifications dealing with economic behaviour
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in differentiated markets at time t should include as exogenous variables the
observations of previous periods, Le. t-l, t-2, and so forth. However, one should not
expect autocorrelation to go away due to such a specification, since it should be
evident that the structure of the underlying economic situation will be far more
complex than any econometric model can comprise. Hence purely econometric
techniques such as Cochrane & Orcutt's (1949) method will have to be applied even if
the model is correctly specified.
8.4 Summary.
In several models involving the actions of a producer population in relation to the
behaviour of a population of consumers, the behaviour of both the producers and the
consumers is assumed to be based on full information. It should be common
knowledge that this is never the case in principle. Since most producers have some
influence on the behaviour of the consumers, at least the actions of these producers
will almost always be based on assumptions and assessments of what the consumers
will do given a specific action at the hand of a particular producer. Inparticular the
demand relation that every producer has to use in determining his price, will represent
a forecast, not a known truth.
Let us consider the problem of measuring demand from the point of view of a
member of a producer population. If demand is defmed as the expressed desire of the
consumers, then demand will never be observable to any producer until the producer
has presented his offer to the market. Therefore, demand by nature is something that
occurs as a consequence of, among other things, the actions of the producer. The
producer will accordingly have to present his offer to the market without knowing the
demand he will face. It follows that the demand is some future event and hence
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uncertain. Since the producer will have to set his price based on some notion as to
how the consumers will react, he will have to measure or assess the demand based on
limited information. In assuming a deterministic demand relation this fact is not
always apprehended by analysts.
This treatise researches some of the implications of assuming that the producers
face such uncertainties in the context of differentiated markets. Accordingly the
fundamental objective of this treatise is to point out that every demand relation which
any producer is faced with will always be a forecast, and therefore uncertain. The
main objective of the treatise is to establish how this uncertainty is to be accounted for
in an economic model of market behaviour in discrete and differentiated markets.
We have established that the producers view the demand from the consumers as
uncertain, and that this uncertainty, by all producers involved, is measured through
the use of choice probabilities. We have pointed out that the only relevant information
which should be assumed to be in the possession of the producers relates to the
principles of economic behaviour, and records of historical market data. Furthermore,
we have established that among the numerous possible probability distributions that
can be assigned to measure this uncertainty, only one particular class will be used by
the producers. The probability distribution employed by all members of the producer
population will be the unique distribution that satisfies the fundamental axioms of
choice, and the information available to the producer.
This fact being established we proceed to show how in such a market of
differentiated products a unique equilibrium point can be assured, assuming that price
is the only strategic variable of the producers. Thus a basic theory of producer
assessment of demand and market equilibrium in a discrete and differentiated market
is presented.
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We have shown above that our basic model, based only on price as a
discriminating variable, can easily be extended to include any other information such
as marketing surveys and marketing efforts, and any other relevant data. What data is
relevant has to be decided by the analyst However, the basic concept is the same. An
unbiased measure for the industry uncertainty is constructed. As Shannon (1948)
have shown in theorem S33 the only unbiased measure is H(P). Hence the relevant
information has to be formulated as constraints to the problem of maximizing H(p).
H(p) behaves so that it reaches its maximum when uncertainty is total. Subsequently
H(p) is maximized subject to the relevant constraints since the minimal information p
is what we are seeking.
We have shown that in a discrete and differentiated market the producers do face
uncertainty as to which choices the consumers will make. Accordingly the producers
have to make some sort of assessment of demand. Furthermore, we have shown that
this assessment will have to be carried out in the way we have devised in this treatise.
We have also shown that the total assessment problem includes an assessment of the
market price equilibrium as well, and based on this price equilibrium the producers set
their offers in the market. The inclusion of additional information such as information
gained in a market survey, or the inclusion of marketing efforts, do not change this
process, and the principal result. However, the inclusion of such additional
information, as well as positive arid different variable costs, do change the actual
result. If the variable costs are assumed to be equal all through the industry, the
equilibrium will be achieved when all producers have the same price and produce the
same quantity. This follows from equation [E49]. If the variable costs, Vj 'v'j, as well
as the marketing effort, bj 'v'j, the quality, qj 'v'j, and the information gained by a
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market survey, aj 'v'j, is different for most firms, then there will still exist a price
equilibrium, but now both prices and quantities will vary. Hence the inclusion of
additional information makes the model more realistic and practical, but does not
change the fundamental results.
Consequently we may conclude that we have arrived at a general theory of how
relevant information should be comprised into a tenable model of economic behaviour
in discrete and differentiated markets. This has to be considered a step forward in the
microeconomic analysis of differentiated markets, since most models used to model
such markets are not able to account for a broad range of relevant information in a
reasonable way and at the same time achieve an equilibrium solution. In fact,
reasonable models accounting for finn specific information, which simultaneously
models economic human behaviour in a consistent way, have not so far been available
when it comes to differentiated markets. To the extent that consistent models of
producer behaviour in differentiated markets, accounting for a wide range of firm
specific and industry related information, but not complete information, is of interest,
the model presented in this treatise should satisfy a need.
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